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COMMENT
The December 10 election result poses 
several problems which must be squarely 
faced by the left. Some o f them are:
* To anlayse the reasons for Fraser’s 
victory
* T o  d e v e l o p  a m u c h  d e e p e r  
understanding of Australian society, in 
particular the ideology and aspirations 
of the workers, so as to both understand 
the vote for Fraser and assist the left to 
develop the concrete long-term strategy 
for an ‘Australian road to socialism’.
* To devise policies, strategy and tactics to 
meet the inevitable increase in anti­
worker, authoritarian and repressive 
initiatives
The election merely confirmed in its own 
way a long-observed fact about the working 
class, in Australia and all capitalist 
societies: not all the working class, or even a 
majority of it, will always act in its own best 
short-term or long-term interests. The 
working class condition under capitalism 
can lead it to believe and follow the political 
representatives o f the class which exploits it; 
to be taken in by the system and its myths 
and to reject the real solutions to its 
problems. This often has been, and is, true of 
some of the most oppressed and exploited 
workers. All the more, then, can it be true o f a 
working class which, on average, enjoys 
living standards and conditions better than 
virtually any other subordinate class in 
history, with the possible exception of the 
contemporary north American working 
class.
Australian Democrats rather than for Labor. 
On the other hand, Labor still has a very 
solid base of support - not very much less, in 
fact, than other big social-democratic parties 
in advanced capitalist societies and still 
bigger than many such parties.
It is important to look at votes rather than 
seats. The L/N CP vote dropped from 52.6 per 
cent in 1975 to 48 per cent, yet even without 
the distribution o f Democrat preferences, the 
coalition has a majority similar to that o f ’75. 
(Labor with a 52 per cent vote in ’72 had a 
majority o f 11 seats.) Labor with 40 per cent 
o f the vote got 30 per cent of the seats; the 
NCP with 9,6 per cent has 15 per cent o f the 
seats; the Democrats with 9.3 per cent got no 
seats in the Reps. As almost always, the 
single member constituency electoral 
method, almost unique to English-speaking 
countries (most other democracies have some 
version of proportional representation) tells 
against Labor.
But, accepting the fact that a substantial 
section o f workers voted Liberal, there are 
both immediate and underlying causes. The 
immediate ones include:
* Fear o f change and the unknown;
* fear of a return to what is seen as 
upheaval and mismanagement under 
the Whitlam government;
* a belief that Labor was/is a poor 
economic manager;
* doubt that Labor could do anything to 
overcome the crisis and improve things;
* a tjfelief that the L-NCP coalition are the
The meaning o f the result itself should 
be neither ignored nor exaggerated. On the 
one hand, it is clear that large numW a  nf 
workers voted either for Fraser o ttihjavtftSITY o f t  
W O L L O N G O N G  
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“natural rulers” and can get the best out 
le system.
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The underlying causes involve fflore long­
term processes and factors at work in 
Australian society. These have to do with 
both the objective circumstances of life here 
for many working people and with the 
traditions and culture of the working class, 
derived from Britain and developing in 
Australian conditions. The main tradition of 
the British working class has always been 
reformist and so it has been in Australia. In 
Britain this tradition was sustained by the 
crumbs which the ruling class could afford 
from its well-stocked imperialist table. In 
Australia, during many militant struggles, 
workers have been able to win very good 
conditions relative to those o f workers in 
other countries. (We are speaking here of an 
average - many unskilled, migrant and 
women workers work and live in poverty-line 
conditions.) None of this has been due to the 
benevolence or cleverness o f Australian 
capitalists - rather to what the system could 
concede to working class militancy.
In some senses, reformism has succeeded 
for many workers over the long boom period. 
This is especially so in terms of the aims 
many workers set themselves during this 
period: to substantially improve their living 
conditions and achieve personal security 
after the insecurity o f the Depression and 
war years. It is not to ignore the poverty and 
hardship of many to note the fact that the 
real living standards o f most workers rose 
substantially during the boom period. Many 
workers associate these improvements with 
Liberal-Country Party government. In 1977, 
as in 1975, one component of the vote for 
Fraser was a mistaken yearning for the 
boom period o f the ’fifties, associated with 
Menzies and the Liberals.
In Australia as in few other capitalist 
countries, it was possible for some workers to 
find individual solutions and personal 
advancement. This section provides the base 
of ‘working class conservatism' although 
Liberal-voting workers can also be found 
among unskilled and poorer workers.
It was reasonable to expect that the onset 
o f a long period o f economic decline and 
s t a g n a t i o n  w o u l d  l e a d  to  a new  
radicalisation o f the working class and a 
renewed interest in socialist solutions. To a 
certain extent this has happened, especially 
in countries with a strong Communist Party 
and/or left-leaning Socialist Party, where
socialist consciousness is already high. But 
it is observable that in most advanced 
capitalist countries, working class support 
for reformist and even conservative parties 
has not swung dramatically away and 
towards the left. Indeed, in some places, it 
has swung right, although usually this is 
where the ‘left’ alternative has been a 
reformist party incapable o f providing 
credible solutions to the crisis. A small 
section o f workers has even been attracted to 
racist and reactionary groups like the 
National Front in Britain.
All this merely reinforces the historical 
lesson that a period of capitalist crisis does 
not necessarily throw up the social forces 
which have the vision, organisation and 
active spirit necessary for a basic social 
transformation in the direction o f socialism. 
To take just the most obvious example: the 
Great Depression, one o f the most traumatic 
events in the history of capitalism, did not 
lead to one socialist revolution. In Germany, 
it not only led to fascism but to the wiping out 
o f the German Communist Party as a mass 
force (speaking, of course, of West Germany). 
This cannot be blamed only on the mistakes 
of leaders and parties, although these 
abounded.
These experiences, and today’s realities, 
raise very sharply the question o f ruling 
class hegemony - the hold o f the system’s 
ideas, values and culture over the mass of the 
people. This hold is a feature o f all class 
societies and is what, together with the use of
force and coercion, has made oppressed 
classes and groups throughout history 
accept, for long periods, their oppression as 
inevitable or even right.
Modem capitalist society is characterised 
by great sophistication of capitalist ideas, by 
vastly improved methods o f inculcating and 
reinforcing them (via the mass media and 
the education system) and by objective 
circumstances (the long boom) which give 
added weight to them. Australian capitalism 
has had  both  f a v o r a b l e  ob je c t ive
circum stances and the absence o f a 
revolutionary and socialist tradition in the 
working class to assist this process of
ideological hegemony.
A concrete example illustrates the point 
and drives home the fact that glaring 
examples of ills o f the system do not in
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themselves necessarily move workers to 
outrage or protest. When the scandal about 
Utah’s repatriation o f huge profits to 
America was headline news, it was related to 
me by a friend how workers on his job said: 
‘Good luck to them. If they can get away with 
it they deserve the rewards’. The only 
explanation for such attitudes, when even 
the media felt constrained to criticise Utah, 
is that capitalist views and ethics are very 
deeply ingrained in some sections o f workers. 
They accept the myths of private enterprise 
and ‘get what you can when you can’. Also, 
some workers express such views because 
they are reasonably satisfied with their own 
lot or have inflated ideas o f their prospects.
A more exact indication o f working class 
views was given in a survey o f AMWU 
members in 1976. Conducted by students in 
S ydn ey  U n iv e rs ity ’ s G overn m en t 
Department, the survey sought workers’ 
attitudes to a number of issues concerned 
with their workplace and the union. The 
AMWU membership is one of the most 
advanced sections o f workers. Yet the survey 
showed that, depending on the issue, 
anything from one-quarter to one-half of the 
membership was conservative in their views. 
For instance, 29 per cent thought unions put 
too many restrictions on employers; 63 per 
cent d isagreed  that unions should have 
more power; 41 per cent thought unions 
strike too often; 23.5 per cent thought the 
government should have more control over 
unions, 21 per cent disagreed that everyone 
in the factory should be in the union; 63 per 
cent agreed they were satisfied with working 
conditions on their job; 53 per cent agreed 
they were paid what their work was worth; 41 
per cent thought that ‘if we start letting the 
workers make more decisions then the 
company will go broke’; 53 per cent thought 
that most workers are not capable o f making 
important factory decisions; 69 per cent 
agreed that ‘workers would fight too much 
between themselves if allowed to make their 
own decisions about who to hire and fire’; 
asked whether it should be the company or 
the union which sets up a system which lets 
workers help make factory decisions, 13 per 
cent said the union, 38 percent the company, 
and 42 per cent both.
As with any survey of opinion these results 
may be open to challenge and to different 
interpretations but, in general, they are 
probably a fair reflection of workers’
attitudes. They do need to be balanced by the 
answers o f the section who showed more 
class consciousness and advanced views. 
Equally, the contradictory nature of the 
attitudes should be recognised. For instance, 
while 53 per cent thought most workers were 
not capable o f making important factory 
decisions, 73 per cent agreed that ‘I would 
work better if decisions on things like how 
my work is organised were made by both the 
workers and the bosses’. 80 per cent thought 
most workers will accept more responsibility 
if they are more involved in factory 
decisions, and 61 per cent would like a chance 
to make more decisions about how things are 
run in the factory.
The many indications of conservatism 
among large sections o f workers should not 
blind us to the positive features o f the 
Australian working class. On some counts, 
Australian workers have shown a radicalism 
not seen elsewhere. It was militant struggles 
which gained Australian workers their high 
living standards; sections like the wharfies 
and seamen have an impressive record o f 
internationalism; the Green Bans were a 
unique phenomenon, way in advance of 
similar workers’ actions elsewhere; it is not 
often that other working classes have taken 
actions similar to the 1969 Penal Clauses 
strike during the jailing of Clarrie O’Shea; 
the mass movement against uranium 
mining is amazingly strong when it is 
realised that Australia does not have nuclear 
power itself so that to be opposed to mining 
requires more than a direct personal threat. 
In general, there is a better ‘integration’ o f 
the workers’ movement with the new social 
movements than in other countries.
Then, too, it must be considered that 
conservative and reformist ideas may be 
changed very suddenly by circumstances: 
such a process has occurred in most 
revolutions. Which is not to say that policies 
and political methods can be based solely on 
the possib ility  such a thing will happen 
some time in the future, since this might be 
next year or next centu ry. But it is to say that 
the hold o f ideas is not fixed and permanent 
but relies very much on social circumstances 
and is open to contestation by the proponents 
of different ideas. The fact that working class 
conservatism and reformism are often 
inconsistent and contradictory shows too the 
possibilities o f  change in the right 
circumstances.
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None of the problems of conservatism 
mean that the left should become pessimistic 
and abandon the struggle for socialism in 
Australia as hopeless. But a socialist 
strategy must, in the first place, be based on 
an ob jectiv e  analysis of society and social 
development. Analysis of social structures, 
and the u n d er ly in g  d y n a m ics  and 
contradictions o f a given society are 
essential. But, so too, is the accurate 
appraisal o f the balance of political forces, o f 
mass opinion, degree of class consciousness 
and organisation and the aims and 
aspirations o f workers and others who must 
provide the mass base for socialism.
The Political Level
It is often easy for marxists to forget about 
this last aspect and concentrate on laying 
bare the objective ‘skeleton’ of capitalist 
society: its structures, contradictions and 
tendencies o f development. But the political 
level o f society has its own relative autonomy 
from, as well as connection with, the levels of 
structures and inner dynamics. Experience 
and history show conclusively that even 
when the objective realities of capitalism 
manifest themselves most obviously, as in 
inflation, unemployment, poverty and 
oppression, those who suffer most do not 
necessarily see the real causes, nor support 
socialist solutions, nor even organise 
themselves to fight for their own conditions 
and rights.
It is this gap between reality and 
consciousness which Marx was referring to 
when he distinguished between a ‘class in 
itself and a ‘class for itself. Speaking o f the 
French peasantry he pointed that insofar as 
they shared a common social situation and 
objective relation to other classes they 
formed a class. But insofar as they did or did 
not perceive a common situation and 
common interests and develop organisation 
to collectively fight for their interests, they 
did or did not form a class. So, for Marx, class 
consciousness is not only important, it enters 
the very definition o f class, which has a 
contradictory tension, both in fact and in 
concept, between objective and subjective 
factors.
Since it is at the politica l level o f society 
that a party and movement operate, it 
follows that socialists in Australia must,
among other things, think long and hard 
about how, and in what conditions, the 
prevailing working class commitment to 
reformist and conservative ideas might be 
changed. Such thinking cannot be done in 
ivory towers or armchairs but only in the 
course o f practical struggles from which 
conclusions and lessons are drawn which 
enrich theory and provide a factual basis for 
strategies and policies. Too much the 
marxist practitioners in the armchairs and 
ivory towers want to make the facts fit the 
theory, preferring to ignore those facts and 
realities which might upset the picture.
Labor Debate
As after any major defeat for the ALP, 
there is now a major debate on the party’s 
future course, policies and strategy. The 
election for the party parliam entary 
leadership showed a turn to the right and to 
‘moderation’. And so far it has been the right 
of the party which has been most vocal in 
advocating solutions to the party’s problems.
Broadly speaking, the line is that Labor 
must show itself to be a better ‘economic 
manager’ than the L-NCP coalition and 
introduce only such reforms as are made 
possible by ‘economic realities’ . As Mr. 
Hayden put it at the press conference after 
his election as leader: the Labor Party wants 
change to the extent this is ‘responsible’ . At 
the same conference he said he believes there 
is “ a very strong case for reward for initiative 
and risk in a mixed economy” . He qualified 
this by saying there is also a need to make 
sure that people are not disadvantaged and 
perpetuated in thatdisadvantage. Writing in 
the F inancial R eview  under the heading 
‘Hayden does a Fraser’, Brian Toohey 
commented on the similarity of this to 
F r a s e r ’ s s ta te d  ‘ c o n c e r n  fo r  the 
disadvantaged within an economy based 
upon reward for initiative’.
But what risks and initiatives are taken by 
the really big profit-making corporations in 
Australia which could not have been taken 
by public sector enterprises? The story of the 
Holden is well known - how the Chifley 
government underwrote all the risks of the 
US car giant GM which then showed its 
gratitude by taking over all Australian 
interests when the company was well
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established and making huge profits. Even 
more glaring is the way that vast natural 
resources are now being handed over to 
multinational corporations who are or will be 
raking in fabulous profits by ripping out the 
resources in a way which maximises their 
profits but minimises the benefits to 
ordinary Australians, not to mention the 
environmental destruction and hazards 
from woodchipping, uranium mining, and so 
on.
It is said in favor of such policies that only 
big multinationals have the money and 
know-how to develop our resources. Yet a 
public enterprise backed by the full resources 
of government and tapping the know-how of 
Australian workers and technicians could 
match these. In any case, know-how can be 
bought and hired and capital borrowed if 
needed. It was revealed recently that Utah’s 
huge profits from the Bowen Basin coal 
deposits derive from an initial investment o f 
$25 million. This is a piddling sum for a 
government and would by now have been 
returned many times over, providing capital 
for development o f other natural resources. 
As advocated by the CPA’s A  N ew  Course 
fo r  A ustralia, the income from a planned 
and publicly-owned natural resources 
developm ent could in turn fund an 
expansion o f public sector manufacturing 
industry under democratic worker and 
community control to avoid the bureaucratic 
inefficiencies of traditional nationalised 
industries.
Mr. Hayden’s view o f the relation between 
the Labor Party and its mass base is that any 
organisation which seeks to serve the 
Australian public must ‘evolve along with 
that community’. There is no doubt that a 
mass party must listen to the masses. But 
equally it can only fulfill its responsibilities 
to them if it presents the facts and an 
analysis of what is happening. To its credit, 
the Labor Party did this on the issue of Viet 
Nam, despite the waverings of many o f its 
leaders including Whitlam, and was in the 
end vindicated in its stand. As admitted by 
defeated prime minister M cM ahon, 
revulsion against the Vet Nam war played a 
part in Labor’s 1972 victory.
The key fact ignored by the Hayden 
argument is that the economic problems are 
the products o f the very system he proposes 
to manage better and more ‘responsibly’
than the Liberals. In particular, the crisis of 
Australian manufacturing industry has as 
one major cause the diversion o f investment 
capital into the much more profitable 
resources area. Because the mining sector is 
more capital intensive than manufacturing 
(by a factor of at least 10) this diversion o f 
capital creates more unemployment, with 
little prospect o f improvement so long as 
such investment priorities remain.
If this analysis is even only partly correct, 
there is no way that a private profit system 
based on ‘reward for initiative’ will ever build 
a healthy manufacturing industry and 
restore full employment. Naturally, if reward 
for initiative is the guiding philosophy, then 
capital and human efforts will be directed to 
gaining the greatest reward for the least 
initiative, i.e. by ripping out natural 
resources as fast as possible, in the process 
running down all but the most profitable 
manufacturing industry.
The only way private enterprise will 
rebuild manufacturing is with the aid of 
government hand-outs and incentives, such 
as the existing scheme whereby businesses 
are paid $63 per week to give young 
unemployed a job. Naturally, business does 
not reject such ‘creeping socialism’ which 
serves its interests. But the labor movement 
ought to ask itself whether such government 
hand-outs should be given with no strings 
attached. Should they not be used as a lever 
to gain democratic public say in the 
enterprises so assisted? Or could the money 
be better spent e s ta b lis h in g  new 
manufacturing industries, such as a solar 
heater industry, publicly owned and 
democratically controlled?
What might be called the conscious and 
ideological right of the Labor Party has got 
in quick for its chop. In articles in The 
A ustralian and The Sydney M orning 
H erald, two leading members from the NSW 
Labor Party, Bob Carr and Joe Thompson, 
have pushed the so-called ‘moderate’ line. 
This is that the Labor Party nationally must 
adopt the policies o f the Wran, Dunstan and 
Lowe state governments and learn from the 
example o f the German Social-Democrats. 
According to Joe Thompson, NSW secretary 
and Federal president o f the Vehicle 
Builders’ Union:
“ The State Labor administrators have 
bent over backwards to co-operate with
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business and they’ve appealed to the country 
voter. But they’ve also been successful with, 
their programs o f reform.... But there has not 
been a rush to do everything in three years or 
to go further than the middle ground o f  
politics would allow." (The Australian, 
7.2.78.)
But a good example o f just how far 
‘bending over backwards’ will get you (no, 
it’s not up your own .... ) was the deal 
announced by Wran for Ford to build a new 
car plant near Campbelltown. He billed it as 
a good example o f co-operation between his 
government and business and of how the 
government was attracting business. A  few 
weeks later Ford announced it was not going 
ahead with the plans. So the essential 
powerlessness o f government in the face of 
self-interested private enterprise was again 
demonstrated. Mr. Thom pson ’s own 
members suffered from the failure to expand 
Ford’s operations.
It is ironic that the Labor right should now 
be suggesting that Mr. Whitlam went too far, 
too fast. When he succeeded Mr. Calwell in 
1967 as leader, the same wing o f the party 
saw him as the person who could modernise 
the party, take away its rough and radical 
image and win the middle ground. To a large 
degree, Whitlam did many o f these things 
but in retrospect, it can be seen that he was 
more committed to reforms in areas like 
education, social welfare, urban renewal, 
and health care than many o f his colleagues. 
In any case, these reforms were hardly 
radical. Now it is Mr. Hayden who will play 
Whitlam to Whitlam’s Calwell!
What is ignored by these commentators is 
that it was not the reforms themselves which 
people voted against in 1975 and 1977 but the 
inability o f Labor to solve the economic 
crisis. This inability was a liability on its 
own but it also assisted the media campaign 
which portrayed social reform s and 
economic recovery as incompatible. Within 
the logic o f the system there was a certain 
truth in this. But had Labor been prepared to 
begin to tackle the basic causes of the crisis 
instead o f succumbing to the logic of the 
system, it could have retained support for 
itself and its reform program. This would 
have required tackling the power over 
economic decision making o f large local and 
multinational firms. Of course, it was
precisely this that Labor was neither willing 
nor prepared to do so it bogged down in a 
contradictory mire o f  indecision and 
division.
Labor did not have to ‘introduce socialism* 
but rather begin to put enough key economic 
levers in its own hands both to be in a 
position to tackle the problems and to 
prevent the sort o f economic undermining 
engaged in by private enterprise. Further, if 
Labor is going to give up significant reform 
programs and compete with the Liberals in 
economic management in capitalist terms, 
why should its own base vote for it at all?
Another assumption o f the Labor right’s 
argument is that the middle ground can only 
be won by watering down Labor’s policies 
and proceeding more cautiously. Yet there 
are many issues where the middle ground 
supports policies more radical than those of 
Labor’s right. Uranium is a good example. 
Carr warns that the Australian Democrats 
will pick up the middle ground permanently 
unless Labor is careful. Yet one o f the bases 
of Democrat support among the previously 
Liberal middle ground was its anti-uranium 
mining stance - precisely the policy which 
the Labor right opposed  for the ALP!
Of course, it is not expected that any of this 
will convince Labor’s right which long ago 
gave up any socialist perspective, if it ever 
had one, and who believe that talk of 
socialism, even o f steps like nationalisation, 
is ‘fundamentalist’ and old hat. Time will tell 
whether their solutions achieve anything, 
even the much longed-for stable electoral 
majority. It is to be hoped, though, that the 
Labor left will develop a much more coherent 
ideology and policy than hitherto so as to 
more effectively combat the attempts to take 
the party even further to the right. Many 
Labor members and supporters do not want a 
rightward shift but they need a coherent 
policy and line to support.
The left outside the Labor Party, including 
the Communist Party, cannot rely on the 
development o f a more coherent IAbor 
left which, in any case, is more likely the 
stronger the extra-ALP left and its mass 
influence become. Nor can the left ignore 
developments inside the Labor Party since 
the latter still has the overwhelming support 
of the working class which even through 
many disappointments looks to Labor for 
solutions to its problems.
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What, then, should be the perspectives and 
strategy of the extra-ALP left in the post­
election situation? In the first place, while 
seeking to grapple with the political realities 
behind the election result, we should not lose 
sight of the fact that the contradictions of 
capitalism, both old and new, remain. 
Among others, they manifest themselves in 
these ways:
* Inability to permanently solve economic 
problems and develop a stable economy 
based on social needs and free from 
unemployment and inflation.
* Inability, despite a huge absolute growth 
of production, to achieve any significant 
redistribution of wealth to level up the 
continuing glaring social inequalities.
* Inability to take full and rational 
advantage o f the ‘great leap forward’ of 
the productive forces in the postwar 
boom - in particular, failure to utilise 
anything like the full liberatory 
potential of science and technology 
which are made the servants o f profit.
* Disregard for and inability to solve the 
worsening environmental crisis which, 
if anything, is more ignored these days 
with the economic troubles used as an 
excuse not to take the necessary actions.
* Inability to basically  tackle the 
oppression of women and the whole 
crisis of human relationships, problems 
which are also swept under the mat of 
the economic crisis.
These and other contradictions and 
problems are not abolished by Fraser’s 
victory; rather they are likely to be 
sharpened by it. They can, and will, lead to 
renewed upsurges o f mass activity and 
struggle, though naturally no timetable can 
be put on this. These objective facts provide 
the basis for the left’s work. But, in turn, this 
work will only bring out the maximum 
politica l manifestation of the objective 
contradictions to the extent that it develops a 
strategy and method of work based on a deep 
understanding o f existing political realities 
and the possibilities contained within them. 
In the first place, that means finding out 
where working people are at, what they feel 
and want, what they will support and what 
they won’t. In particular, can we identify
what are the barriers, in workers’ minds, 
social situation and experiences, to their 
shifting from reformism to socialism, or a 
program which would be a transition in the 
direction o f socialism?
In the second place, the strategy and 
policies can only be developed in a long 
process o f dialogue and discussion with the 
working people. This means putting things 
in their language, being concrete and putting 
forward, in addition to long-term goals, 
transitional programs which are seen to be 
realistic and capable of being fought for. To 
do this means being prepared to learn from 
practical experiences which should not only 
be guided by theory but also change and 
modify theory. A  theory with such a relation 
to practice is truly a th eory  o f  po litics  (or a 
politicised theory) as opposed to an 
academicised, rarefied and doctrinised 
theory.
The main task of the left, therefore, is to get 
out into the community and the workforce so 
as to maintain and extend the difficult daily 
work o f convincing people, assisting them in 
thei_r struggles and in setting up or 
improving organisations which can counter 
the powers they are up against.
If this is done two dangers in the present 
period will be avoided:
* S u ccu m bin g  to p essim ism  and 
hopelessness, leading to a loss of will 
and activity
* ‘Standing on our digs’ in the belief that 
we are still right and don’t need to 
change anything as a result o f the 
election but continue as before until the 
workers are forced to see the truth by the 
objective circumstances. This could only 
lead to objective sterility and isolation
The aim o f the left should be, in practice, 
policy and publicity, to lower the obstacles to 
Australian workers opting for real solutions. 
Immediate and transitional programs can do 
this by assisting people to take the first steps, 
both in thought and action, down the path to 
socialism. The Communist Party’s proposal 
A  N ew  Course fo r  Australia  is a public 
discussion document of this type. A L R  
rea ders who have not yet s een it are invited to 
write to their nearest CPA office for a copy 
and to submit their comments, criticisms and 
suggestions to the CPA.
B.A., 15.2.78.
CONTEMPORARY 
FEMINISM and
SOCIALIST
MOVEMENTS
Barbara E hrenreich
This paper is concerned with the potential 
insights which contemporary feminist 
m ovem en ts h ave  to o ffe r  s o c ia lis t  
movements in two areas: (1) socialist theory 
about women’s liberation which I take to be a 
key concern o f socialists world-wide; and (2) 
socialist theory and practice more generally, 
apart from the question o f women as a social 
group. Finally, I would like to speculate on 
the practical possibilities o f a synthesis of 
socialist and feminist politics. Though the 
issues I will raise have broad applicability to 
the industrialised countries, my thinking is 
naturally based most heavily on experience 
limited to the United States.
Feminism and the socialist approach to 
women’s liberation
The traditional socialist program for 
women’s liberation, passed down basically 
unchanged from the nineteenth century, is 
two-fold: First, women were to be granted full 
democratic rights, including the right to 
divorce and possession o f property; and, 
second, women were to be integrated into
social production. Through the combination 
o f democratic rights and integration into 
production, it was thought that no obstacles 
to women’s full participation in political life 
would remain, and sexual equality would be 
achieved. Now, there is no question about 
the central importance o f these measures to 
women’s liberation: Feminist movements 
themselves have focused heavily on the legal 
rights o f women and on access to jobs and 
education. The feminist movement in the 
United States is currently investing major 
energy in a campaign for a constitutional 
amendment which would eliminate legal 
discrimination between women and men as 
workers and citizens.
But a major insight of contemporary 
feminism, if I may state it first in purely 
negative fashion, is that a program of 
democratic rights plus integration into social 
production is not sufficient to establish full 
equality between the sexes. It is this insight 
which most strikingly distinguishes 
contemporary feminism from historically
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prior waves of feminist activity and which 
distinguishes the fem inist political 
perspective from the traditional socialist 
program for women’s liberation.
There are several reasons for the late 
twentieth century feminist perception o f the 
inadequacy of the traditional socialist 
program. The first reason is that, in 1970, as 
opposed to 1870 or even 1920, the program of 
democratic rights plus integration into social 
production had, in fact, largely been 
achieved for long enough to make some kind 
o f evaluation possible. The magnitude of this 
achievement cannot be underestimated: 
Socialism has universally brought civil 
equality for women, mass entry o f women 
into social production (hence the possibility 
of individual economic independence from 
the family), supportive social services such 
as child care - not to mention the obvious 
improvements in material security which 
have accrued to both sexes. It is thus with 
considerable envy that feminists within 
capitalist societies have regarded their 
socialist sisters: Socialist women are not 
“second class citizens” in the eyes o f the law; 
they are encouraged in their education or 
vocational training; they are free to 
contribute to social production knowing that 
their children are well cared for.
At the same time, however, the situation of 
women in socialist societies can hardly be 
described as one o f full sexual equality. TTiere 
are shortcomings in the progress of socialist 
women which, persisting as they do after 
many years (and in some cases, more than 
one generation), cannot easily be explained 
as mere vestiges of capitalist or pre-capitalist 
society. To generalise, without reference to 
particular countries, there are three major 
kinds of evidence of the persistence o f sex 
inequality into socialist society:
1. Occupational segregation by sex. Of 
course, this exists in varying degrees in 
various countries - nowhere approaching the 
extrem e o ccu p a tio n a l seg reg a tion  
characteristic of capitalist society. But the 
basic pattern of the sexual division o f labor 
has tended to persist, with women occupying 
rleatively low-paid positions an d /or  
performing stereotyped functions such as 
nursing, child care and personal services of 
various sorts, while men occupy, on the 
average, better-paid positions which are 
more likely to involve decision-making and
to confer prestige. There is some evidence 
th a t w hen w om en h ave  en tered  a 
characteristically male occupation, such as 
m edicine, the social prestige o f that 
occupation tends to decline.
2. Sexual objectification. This again is 
highly variable, with no socialist society 
approaching the decadent extremes 
characteristic of capitalism. One example of 
sexual objectification which has tended to 
persist is the differential adornment o f the 
sexes: The cultural requirement that women 
use clothes and cosmetics to create an 
appearance o f youthfulness, fragility and/or 
sexual availability is something so universal 
that it almost seems “ natural” . Yet in a 
feminist analysis, the emphasis on an 
objectified type o f “beauty” for women is a 
clear cultural hallmark o f male domination, 
and a disturbing thing to note in socialist 
society.
3. Low representation o f  women in 
positions of political leadership. This is 
undoubtedly the most striking and serious 
shortcoming, at least as seen from a 
distance. The levels o f  socialist leadership 
which achieve international visibility are 
almost without exception occupied by men. 
Where is there a female head o f a socialist 
state, or a woman serving as first secretary o f 
the party? How many women can be counted 
on the politburos and legislative bodies of the 
existing socialist countries? What does the 
near-absence of female leadership at the 
national level suggest about women’s 
participation in political life at provincial 
and local levels?
These areas of shortcomings in the 
achievement of sexual equality by no means 
outweigh the tremendous advances women 
have made in socialist society. Nor is there 
any real basis for believing that sexual 
inequality is a fixed, structural feature of 
socialist society, as it has become in 
capitalist society. It may well be that a static 
critique omits significant progress which 
would be evident in a historical survey o f 
women’s status within socialist societies. 
(Or, to take a pessimistic point of view, it may 
be that sexual inequality will tend to increase 
in the European socialist countries with the 
spread of consumerism and consequent 
influence o f Western capitalist culture.) But 
the point is that the traditional socialist 
answer to the “ wom an question”  —
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democratic rights and integration into 
production — has not proved to be a 
sufficient condition for sexual equality: A 
necessary condition, no doubt, but not a 
sufficient one. For a feminist movement 
emerging in the 1970s, this observation was 
inescapable.
A n o t h e r  r e a s o n  f o r  f e m i n i s t  
dissatisfaction with the traditional socialist 
program rests not on the shortcomings of 
socialism, but rather on the “ successes” of 
capitalism. It is striking, almost incredible, 
that the birthplace o f contem porary 
feminism was not a society such as Spain, 
still dominated by rigid patriarchal forms of 
family life and religion, but the United 
States, a society in which women were widely 
considered to have already been “ liberated” . 
Well before the advent o f the current feminist 
movement, women in the United States 
enjoyed a level o f democratic rights and 
workforce participation well beyond that of 
women in the most “ advanced” European 
capitalist countries, not to mention the 
poorer capitalist countries, former colonies, 
etc. Divorce was legal and easily attainable; 
female suffrage had been achieved fifty 
years earlier. M oreover, women were 
entering the workforce in unprecedented 
numbers, particularly in response to the 
rising corporate demand for female clerical 
labor. In 1950, 33.9 per cent o f American 
women were employed; in 1960,37.8 per cent; 
in 1970, 43.4 per cent; and the proportion 
today is 48 per cent. In 1970, the United 
States surpassed Sweden, France, Canada, 
the United Kingdom, Italy, Switzerland and 
the Netherlands in terms of the proportion of 
the labor force which is female. (Though of 
course the labor force participation o f US 
women still lags behind that o f women in 
most industrialised socialist countries.)
So, at the time of the emergence of a 
feminist movement in the United States, the 
socialist program of “ integration into social 
production”  had been achieved to a 
sign ificant extent within  capitalism , 
although hardly on feminist terms. The great 
m ajority o f  women who entered the 
workforce in the ’sixties and ’seventies 
entered relatively low-paid clerical and 
service jobs, and this is reflected in the fact 
that the median income for full-time working 
women in the United States is only 57 per 
cent o f the median incom e for men. 
Thousands of women have been drawn into
struggles around workplace issues — 
discrimination in pay and promotions, lack 
of child care, health and safety issues, etc. 
But in a situation where nearly half the adult 
women are already employed, most in 
relatively unsatisfactory jobs, a political 
program offering “ integration into social 
production ” would be irrelevant, if not ironic.
It is these two factors — disillusionment 
with the political economic “advances” of 
women within capitalism, combined with a 
certain disappointment about the progress of 
women within socialism — which led 
contem porary feminism to reject the 
traditional program of democratic rights 
plus integration into production as an 
adequate basis for women’s liberation. Thus 
contemporary feminism, the feminism of the 
1970s, began with the realisation that the 
solutions to sexual inequality lay not only in 
the realm of political economy, but in an area 
which had so far received little attention 
from political movements — the realm of 
“private life” .
The politics of private life
The existence of a sphere o f “ private life” , 
as distinct from the realm of political 
economy, is a characteristic feature of 
industrial capitalist society, and perhaps 
industrial society in general. In a pre­
industrial “ natural” economy, the family 
was not only a biological unit but a 
productive unit. Work, play, birth, child care, 
food consumption, etc., were all activities 
occurring in the same physical space and 
involving the same group o f household 
members. With the advent of large-scale 
socialised production, the household was 
stripped of most o f its productive activities 
and left with the personal biological 
functions of eating, sexuality, child care, 
rest,’ etc. Patriarchal restrictions, combined 
with women’s traditional centrality in child 
raising, dictated that the home, rather than 
the socialised workplace, was woman’s 
“ proper” sphere of activity. Private life 
■became the major focus o f women’s work 
(usually even for women in the paid 
workforce); it was, furthermore, the major 
locus o f “ sex role reproduction” : the place 
where small children learn the forms of 
behavior deemed appropriate for their sex. 
Inevitably, then, feminist analysis would 
have to investigate the realm o f private life,
CONTEMPORARY FEMINISM & SOCIALIST MOVEMENTS 11
and a feminist program would have to 
address the issues arising from it.
With some significant exceptions, the 
terrain of private life has been largely 
omitted from the mainstream of marxist 
theory. Lenin, for example, saw the home as 
a sort of backwater, left behind by industrial 
progress but still capable of breeding 
conservatism even within modem socialist 
society (hence, in part, his insistence on 
w om en’s full integration into social 
production). The most serious attempts in the 
West to analyse the relations o f private life 
have come from Freudian-oriented marxists 
and marxists associated with the “critical 
theory”  school. If I may summarise their 
concerns rather sketchily, they have tended 
to focus on: (1) The “ ancient” aspects of 
family relations — the system of patriarchal 
authority which survives from a pre­
industrial mode of production. Reich and 
others saw the patriarchal authoritarianism 
of the family as the psychological basis for 
authoritarian relations within the entire 
society, as between classes. (2) The most 
“modern” aspect of private life — its 
penetration by advertising, consumer goods, 
external “ expert” authorities, etc., to the 
point where the distinction  between 
“private” and “ political economic” realms of 
social existence begins to be a dubious one. 
Marcuse, for example, relates the corporate 
penetration of private life to the diminished 
political autonomy of the working class in 
advanced industrial countries. Thus, theneo- 
marxist analyses of the real of private life 
created by industrial capitalism emphasise 
the importance of the private realm from a 
political economic point of view: It is the 
locus o f the reproduction of the personality 
types (and, o f course, actual human beings) 
required by class society, and it is one of the 
latest frontiers for the expansion o f the 
capitalist market.
However, as the American historian Eli 
Zaretsky has argued, it was not until the 
rebirth of a feminist mo vement in the last ten 
years that issues related to private life were 
projected out of the realm of theory and into 
the arena o f political struggle. Feminist 
analysis tended to differ from that o f the 
(male) neo-marxists in that it focused on 
private life not merely as an influence on, or 
appendage of, the political economy, but as a 
realm of human experience having intrinsic 
importance if we are to comprehend the
situation o f women and how to change it. 
Thus the feminist movement highlighted a 
series of issues which had been largely 
neglected by marxists, either because they 
seemed to be too trivial, divisive, or perhaps 
simply embarrassing to discuss. These 
include:
— the biological subjugation of women 
within the family and within personal 
relationships generally: subjection to 
unwanted pregnancies, to physical 
abuse and coercive styles of male 
sexuality (of which rape is only the 
extreme).
— re la tion s  o f  d om in a tion  and 
submission between women and men. 
These relations are nurtured within the 
patriarchal family, but extend into 
public interactions between women and 
men, for example, in the workplace and 
even within political organisations. The 
expressions o f male domination may be 
overt, as in the common assumption that 
in a mixed gathering women will do the 
more “menial” work of serving food and 
drinks. Or they may be subtle, taking the 
form o f  disparaging remarks and 
patronising attitudes, or the use o f 
modes of discourse which tend to exclude 
women’s participation.
— the social devaluation o f domestic 
labor. With the development o f  
socialised production, women’s work in 
the home was by no means abolished. In 
fact there is evidence that over the last 
hundred years rising standards of 
cleanliness and rising expectations 
about the m other’s role in early 
childhood socialisation have actually 
increased the housewife’s hours o f labor. 
Yet the only recognition of women’s 
dom estic labor afforded in most 
capitalist countries is o f a purely 
sentim ental nature. There is no 
economic security for mothers who are 
deserted by their husbands; there are no 
pensions for women who have spent 
their lives as housekeepers and mothers.
— the corporate penetration o f private 
life, which has depended primarily on 
the m a n ip u la tion  o f w om en as 
consumers (often through advertising 
w h i«h  presen ts in su lt in g  and 
stereotyped images of women) and leads 
to dubious improvements in the quality
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o f wom en’s lives. (To give a few 
examples: Certain feminine hygiene 
products introduced in the United States 
with considerable advertising have 
turned out to be hazardous to the user’s 
health; recent studies show that the 
introduction of “ labor-saving” devices 
over the last 50 years has not led to a 
decrease in women’s domestic work; 
p r e p a r e d  b a b y  f o o d s  c o n ta in  
unhealthful quantities of salt and sugar, 
etc.)
To say that these issues related to private 
life have been opened up by the feminist 
movement is by no means to say that they 
have been resolved, or can easily be resolved, 
even within the realm o f theory and 
analysis.In fact, these issues raise serious 
questions o f relevance for both socialist and 
feminist movements.
Take the issue o f women’s domestic labor: 
There can be no question about the social 
value of domestic labor, despite the fact that 
it is unwaged and perform ed in the 
privatised setting o f the home. In certain 
capitalist countries (Italy, the United States, 
England) some feminists have argued that 
the women’s movement should focus on a 
demand for econom ic recognition o f 
domestic work, or “wages for housework” . 
Such a demand would recognise the strategic 
position of women as workers and their 
productive role in society. On the other hand, 
it has been argued that state subsidisation o f 
women’s domestic labor would (1) reinforce 
the prevailing notion that this is a uniquely 
female form of labor, and (2) add nothing to 
the material well-being o f the working class, 
since the wages for housework would 
undoubtedly be drawn from the general wage 
of the class (e.g. by higher taxation). Within 
socialist society, there remain questions 
about the social valuation o f domestic labor 
and the best strategies for dealing with it. 
Too often, women’s “ integration into social 
production” has only meant that most 
women have two jobs — one in social 
production and one in the home. Should this 
situation be recognised with reduced hours 
for working women and perhaps formal 
payment for their domestic work? Or should 
the situation itself be changed, for example, 
by pressure to increase male participation in 
domestic work or by further socialisation o f
this work? What solutions are most 
consistent with the needs o f children, and, if 
possible, with long-standing cultural 
traditions?
U nderlying these questions about 
domestic labor is an even more fundamental 
issue: the question o f the family and its role 
as a basic social unit. Within the United 
States there has been considerable debate 
over whether left and feminist groups should 
concentrate on criticising the traditional 
family or defending it. The analysis which 
reveals the family as the key site in the 
reproduction of hierarchical relationships 
(between women and men, and between 
people in general) has led some to conclude 
that the abolition o f the family as we know it 
is essential to women’s liberation. In this 
view, an im portant task for radical 
movements is the creation o f alternative 
living arrangements which will meet 
people’s needs for companionship, sexuality, 
etc, in  the a b sen ce  o f  tra d it io n a l 
authoritarian relationships. Others argue 
that the family, for all its faults, is the only 
refuge for the human values o f affection, 
nurturance, etc., within capitalist society, 
and represents the only security most women 
know. Rather than building alternatives, 
which are unlikely to survive within 
capitalist society anyway, the movement 
should focus on improving women’s position 
within the existing family structure. (From 
either point of view, the persistence of the 
conventional fam ily  structure within 
socialist societies, and the failure o f these 
societies to encourage the development of 
alternative living arrangements, has been 
puzzling to American feminists.)
However, if there is debate over the specific 
resolution of these issues — both as issues 
which must be confronted within capitalism, 
as issues facing socialist societies, and, 
ultimately, as questions facing future 
communist societies — there does exist a 
feminist consensus on certain principles 
which can be summarised as follows:
That in addition to reforms in the political 
econom ic realm giving women full 
democratic rights and the opportunity for 
participation in social production, women’s 
liberation depends upon -
1. The establishm ent o f wom en’s 
reproductive freedom and physical integrity
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as inalienable rights. This means the right to 
contraceptive measures and abortion 
regardless of national population policy, and 
the right to protection from sexual coercion 
(within or without marriage).
2. A social commitment to the eradication 
of male domination in all its manifestations
— authoritarian relations within the family, 
the sexual objectification  o f women, 
stereotyped images o f women in media and 
culture, and so on.
3. A reappraisal of women’s domestic 
labor, aimed at (a) increased social valuation 
of women’s necessary and productive work 
within the home, which should be 
recognised, for example, with economic 
security for housewives, (b) increased 
sharing of domestic labor between the sexes, 
and (c) the socialisation of functions which 
can be more effectively and satisfactorily 
performed outside the home.
4. Democratic control over the commodity 
ensemble produced for domestic and private 
consum ption, with regard to quality, 
intrinsic use value and ideological content.
Implications for socialist movements
Insofar as women’s liberation, as an issue 
which transcends class, is one of the 
fundamental projects of socialism, then it 
goes without saying that the conclusions of 
contem porary feminism should be o f 
intrinsic interest to all socialists. But I would 
like to turn now to some implications of 
contemporary feminist thought quite apart 
from the “ woman question” . First, by 
analogy, feminism offers important insights 
into relations of domination and submission 
which exist between other social groups, 
such as classes and ethnic groups. Second, 
by its insistence on a politics which embraces 
both the “private" and the political-economic 
sphere, feminism points the way to a more 
comprehensive socialist politics for the 
industrial capitalist countries.
To take first the insights which feminism 
may offer by analogy. As I have stressed, 
contemporary feminism insists that sex 
inequality exists not only at the level of 
political-economic structures, but at the level 
o f personal interactions, within the family, 
within social life, and within political and 
working relationships. Thus the problem of 
inequality, or male domination, must be 
attacked not only in the sphere o f public life,
but in the sphere of deeply rooted attitudes, 
expectations and patterns of behavior. The 
same can be said for relations between 
c la sses  or stra ta : The s ig n if ic a n t  
interactions here do not only occur between 
actual members of classes, on a daily basis, 
and in such a way as to reinforce the 
prevailing patterns of class domination. 
When such interactions carry over into 
progressive political organisations, the 
results can be crippling.
The first example o f this sort o f 
phenomenon in the US left occurred over the 
issue of male-female relations within the 
radical movement of the ’sixties. Despite 
verbal commitment to egalitarianism and 
“ participatory democracy” there existed 
enormous barriers to wom en’s full 
participation in the movement. Meeting 
independently of men, women were able to 
identify some of the barriers to their 
participation, ranging from such obvious 
things as a lack of women in visible 
leadership positions to more subtle issues of 
male “ style", a tendency to long-winded 
polemics, a competitive manner of discourse, 
etc. The resulting efforts to eliminate male 
dominant tendencies within the movement 
were far from uniformly successful (in fact 
many women simply left the “ mixed” 
movement to work independently as 
women). But these efforts did lead to a 
widespread consciousness of the problem of 
“ sexism” (as it came to be called, in analogy 
to racism), and to a great unleashing of 
women’s political energies and leadership 
capabilities.
Today the US left faces a somewhat 
analagous problem in relation to class. 
Coming as it does out o f a largely student 
base, the left is disproportionately middle 
class in composition, by which I mean it 
contains a disproportionate representation 
of people in professional and managerial- 
type occupations, as opposed to those in blue- 
collar and lower-level white collar 
occupations. Since the early ’seventies, the 
left has been preoccupied with the problem of 
expanding beyond its present class base into 
a broader working class constituency. There 
are many obstacles to this effort, which 
belong more properly to a discussion o f US 
working-class history. But from our limited 
experience so far, it is becoming clear that 
some of the obstacles lie at the level of day-to- 
day individual interactions, such as those
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uncovered by feminists in the case of male- 
female relationships in the movement. These 
include: stereotyped expectations of roles 
(e.g, that people from middle class 
backgrounds will do the theoretical and 
analytical work), subtle attitudes of elitism 
and condescension on the part of middle 
class people, the persistent use of terms and 
modes of discourse which are familiar to 
educated people but uncomfortable to less 
educated people, etc. The results of failing to 
address these problems can be passivity 
among working class members, resentment, 
and sometimes even disillusionment with 
left politics.
To generalise a little: The task of building a 
socialist movement within a hetereogeneous 
society such as the United States requires 
building co-operative efforts and common 
organisational forms spanning women and 
men, middle and working class people, and 
people of diverse et hnic backgrounds. In this 
project, the feminist insight that inter-group 
antagomisms and systems of domination are 
expressed not only in political-economic 
structures, but at the level of individual 
interactions, is a lesson which political 
movements can ignore only at their own risk. 
The emerging feminist movement of the late
sixties demanded that political ideals be 
m atched  w ith h igh  sta n d a rd s o f 
interpersonal conduct and mutual respect. 
Without a continuing commitment to the 
feminist principle that “ the personal (the 
ways we behave and treat others on an 
individual basis) is political" there is little 
hope of building a socialist movement which 
w ill span the d iv ergen t and often  
antagonistic social groupings which 
comprise the broad class o f working people 
within a country such as the United States.
The other major contribution that 
contemporary feminism has to offer to 
socialist movements lies simply in its 
affirmation o f the realm of private life as a 
significant arena for political attention, 
analysis and struggle. Socialist politics has 
conventionally focused on class relations as 
they are expressed in the "public” realm of 
socialised production and state functions, 
with secondary attention to culture and other 
elements of the “superstructure” . The 
political consciousness o f the working class 
was assumed to be shaped overwhelmingly 
in the experience of production and through 
interactions with a repressive state 
apparatus. The nature of private life was 
assumed to be determined by the workers’
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needs for biological self-reproduction and  
less importantly by customs and attitudes 
rem a in in g  from  p re -ca p ita list socia l  
formations. With these assum ptions, the 
nature of private life could be safely ignored 
in favor o f concentration on the visible and  
dramatic class struggles over political and  
economic issues.
But two developments in advanced 
capitalist society suggest that these 
assumptions are no longer completely 
adequate, and that a politics based on them 
will fail to address monopoly capitalism as a 
total system. First is the capitalist 
penetration (in response to the continuing 
problem of economic stagnation) of private 
life as a market. This process, beginning in 
the United States in the 1920s and going into 
full swing in the post-war period, affects, 
directly or indirectly, all strata of society. It 
has required an enormous ideological 
cam paign (carried out by individual 
corporations in the form of advertising) to 
“sell” a way of life based on individual 
consumption, and it requires ever more 
refined efforts (marketing techniques, etc.) to 
predict and regulate consumption. To the 
extent that this corporate penetration of 
private life has been successful, the very 
distinction between “private”  and “ public” 
(or political economic) realms o f existence 
ceases to be a meaningful one. The internal 
expansion of the capitalist market within the 
industrialised countries, leaves fewer and 
fewer “backwaters” of social existence, and 
capitalism presents itself at last as a unitary 
system, embracing what were formerly the 
most intimate personal aspects of life.
A second and related development which 
challenges the traditional socialist 
assumptions about the proper sphere for 
political endeavor is the process which the 
American scholar Harry Braverman has 
called the “ degradation of labor” : the 
removal of productive skills from the 
working class and their concentration in a 
stratum o f technical and m anagerial 
workers. This process, necessitated within 
capitalism by the class struggle in the early 
20th century and often emulated within 
socialism as an “ efficiency” measure, has 
the effect of reducing work to a mindless, 
repetitive series o f routines. Rather than 
being a source o f collective strength, social 
production becomes an experience o f 
dehum anisation. Thus working class
aspirations tend to shift to private life as a 
possible arena for the expression o f the 
creativity and autonomy which is so 
thoroughly repressed at the workplace. This 
shift, this psychological privatisation 
originating at the point o f production, only 
reinforces the dom inant drift o f ' late 
capitalist culture towards the social 
atomisation characteristic of a consumption- 
centred economy.
The left in the United States, where these 
trends are most advanced, has yet to 
formulate a political approach which fully 
comprehends these trends and the resulting 
social and cultural conditions. But it is clear 
that a truly relevant politics can no longer 
confine itself to the sphere of the political 
economy as it haB been understood, but must 
extend its analysis and activities into the 
sphere o f “private life” . Is it in fact so 
thoroughly colonised by corporate priorities 
and commoditised relationships, or is it a 
potential breeding ground for resistance? 
What autonomous forms of popular culture 
are emerging and what is their relationship 
to commoditised mass culture? What forms 
o f political activity can break through the 
social atomisation of working class life? To 
dismiss such questions - to abandon the 
terrain of “private life” as irrelevant or 
apolitical is, in fact, to cede it to the 
capitalists. If feminism in the industrialised 
capitalist countries has done nothing else, it 
should at least have alerted left movements 
to the necessity of a socialist politics capable 
o f addressing the totality o f human 
experience within the culture o f  late 
capitalism.
The prospects fo r  a socia list-fem in ist 
synthesis
In the coming years we may expect the 
emergence and continued growth of feminist 
movements within the industrialised 
capitalist countries, for several reasons: (1) 
Over the long run, industrialisation and the 
spread of market relations inevitably 
underm ine tra d it io n a l p a tr ia rch a l 
relationships, which (in the West, at any 
rate) had their material basis in an agrarian 
economy. The gradual erosion of patriarchal 
authority within the family increases 
women^s possibilities o f organising 
independently; (2) Recent advances in the 
technology o f contraception are offering 
women a degree o f  b iologica l self­
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determination undreamed o f by previous 
generations. Even where this technology is 
not easily available because of restrictive 
state policies or high prices, women are 
becoming aware of the material possibility of 
controlling their own reproductivity. This 
awareness was an important factor in the 
growth o f the US women’s movement; (3) The 
increasing cultural integration of the world, 
with the growth of the mass electronic media, 
etc., makes it impossible to contain feminist 
ideas within the boundaries of a few 
countries. Interest in feminism — or, at the 
very least, a new consciousness of women as 
women — is spreading on a world scale.
The feminist movements which emerge 
will continue to challenge the traditional 
socialist formula for women’s liberation and 
to insist on a new kind o f politics embracing 
both the “ public” and the “ private” , the 
economic and the cultural. The question is: 
will the contem porary and emerging 
feminist movements find common ground 
with existing socialist movements — or will 
they become a dissident stream detached 
from the struggle for socialism? I have 
argued that a socialist-feminist synthesis 
would greatly enrich socialist politics (and, 
of course, feminist politics). What are the 
prospects for such a synthesis? I will end 
with some brief speculative comments on 
this question.
The United States presents, at least at this 
time, an exceptional situation and one that 
is historically unprecedented. Namely, a 
situation in which the feminist movement, 
despite its organisational disarray and 
internal disunity, is far larger and more 
broadly based than anything that could be 
called a socialist “ m ovem ent” . Left 
organisations may denounce feminism as 
“ petty bourgeois” or they may court it as an 
essential extension o f the “new left” , but 
their impact is relatively minor. The 
direction which American feminism chooses
— whether socialist or accommodating to 
ca p ita lism  — depends la rg e ly  on 
developments within the feminist movement 
itself and its reaction to the political 
opposition it faces. On the discouraging side, 
the growth o f an anti-feminist “movement” , 
opposed to abortion and equal rights for 
women and unabashedly linked to the far 
r ig h t, has pushed m a jor  fem in is t  
o r g a n is a t io n s  l ik e  th e  N a t io n a l  
Organisation for Women (NOW) towards a
more ‘moderate’ political position. In the face 
of the rightwing attack, N OW has been eager 
to d is s o c ia te  i t s e l f  from  s o c ia lis t  
organisations and from more sweeping 
demands for social justice. On the 
encouraging side, however, fem inism  
continues to expand — as a state o f mind if 
not an organised movement — among 
working class women, creating a militancy 
which spills over and interacts with 
militancy on class issues. Particularly 
striking at this time is the growth o f a black 
feminist movement, highly conscious of the 
“ double jeopardy” o f black women within 
racist society. Any rebirth o f  mass 
radicalism in the United States will be 
heavily shaped by, and perhaps in part 
generated by, the contemporary feminist 
movement.
Within the other industrialised capitalist 
countries, a more historically “normal” 
situation prevails at the present time. 
Socialist movements are strongly and deeply 
rooted in the working class. It is feminism 
which is relatively weak — a newcomer on 
the political scene. Here the possibility o f a 
synthesis o f socialist and feminist politics 
depends most heavily on the reaction o f the 
existing left to the demands and issues raised 
by the emerging feminist movements. The 
crucial question is not whether existing left 
organisations will welcom e fem inist 
movements as they would any other 
■progressive force, but how they will respond 
to those concerns o f feminism which go 
beyond traditional socialist views on 
women’s liberation. The response may be to 
dismiss these concerns as trivial, divisive, or 
even “ ultra-leftist” . Or the response may be 
to seek to incorporate feminist insights into 
the historical body of socialist thought and 
practice. As I have tried to argue here, what 
is at stake in these alternatives is much more 
than the left’s relation to a particular 
constituency (women), but its ability to 
formulate a m eaningful program for 
women’s liberation within socialism, and its 
ability to comprehend the emerging contours 
of late capitalist culture.
Speech given at the International Forum '77 - 
Socialism in the World ■ held at Cavtat, 
Yugoslavia, September 26-30, 1977. 
Reprinted from Socialist Thought and 
P ractice, a Yugoslav monthly. 10 Oct., 1977.
The State and
Australian Socialism
Eric Aarons
Many discussions on theoretical questions 
are as tedious as the TV repeats over the 
holiday season. Let us hope we can make the 
discussions on the state now proceeding 
something more than a re-run of classical 
situations and past controversies.
The issue has arisen again in connection 
with “ eurocommunism” , the dropping of 
“ the dictatorship o f the proletariat”  by the 
French Communist Party, the possibility o f a 
left governm ent resulting from  the 
impending French elections and the political 
crisis in Italy.
Many articles and pam phlets have 
appeared* and at lea st tw o b ook s: 
Eurocom m unism  and the State by the 
Communist Party of Spain’s secretary, 
S a n t ia g o  C a r r i l lo ,  a n d  O n  t h e  
D ictatorsh ip  o f  the P roletaria t by 
E tienne B a lib ar, a m em ber o f  the 
Communist Party of France. Unfortunately, 
only the latter is available in Australia at the 
time of writing.
In Australia the controversy is linked with 
the search for a way forward in the current 
uncongenial political climate, publication of 
the Communist Party o f Australia’s proposal 
A N ew  C ou rse  fo r  A u s tra lia  and 
discussion on the CPA’s general program to 
be adopted at its 26th Congress next year.
To avoid a sterile debate on the state we 
have to locate it in our context. Socialism 
being so far from an immediate prospect 
here, the debate could appear a little 
ridiculous. And it would be if it diverted 
attention from the actual task which is the 
building of the social and political forces
needed to bring revolutionary change and 
make the destination o f the state a real, 
practical question.
but, properly posed, there is a relation, 
because the future and the present are 
connected. One o f the fundamental problems 
of political strategy in fact is to grasp the 
connections, so that the immediate struggles 
lead in the desired direction, not some other.
We have not widely used the term, but "'the 
democratic road to socialism” describes 
fairly well the line the CPA has been 
following over the last decade or so. My aim 
in this article is to discuss the meaning of 
this in relation to the current controversies. 
The following points seem to me especially 
important.
1. A view o f the nature of the problem of 
revolution in a modern capitalist society, 
compared with that in (say) tsarist Russia.
Of course, the nature of the problem cannot 
be completely divorced from the concrete 
setting. The Russian revolution took place 
during a devastating world war, and no 
doubt if Western Europe (or Australia) were - 
perish the thought - similarly involved today, 
policies and strategies would have to be very 
different.
Leaving this aside, however, the despotic 
tsarist state was appropriate to feudalism, as 
was the prevailing ideology. Yet Russia was 
well along the capitalist path even in 
agriculture which, while very backward, was 
increasingly concerned with the production 
o f commodities - goods for exchange as 
distinct from those produced for direct 
consumption.
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The feudal ideology had decomposed. It 
was no longer hegemonic and was ineffective 
in holding the masses of people* within the 
system. The repressive power o f the state was 
therefore the prime obstacle to revolution 
and could be toppled by quick assault. (A new 
ideology appropriate to a socialist system 
was held by only a comparative few - 
advanced workers and some intellectuals - 
and this fact greatly influenced the course of 
later developments. But that is beyond our 
scope here.)
The Italian marxist Antonio Gramsci 
tackled the different problem in more 
industrially developed countries:
‘ ‘In Russia the State was everything, ciuil 
society was primordial and gelatinous; in the 
West, there was a proper relation between 
State and civil society, and when the State 
trembled a sturdy structure o f civil society 
was at once revealed, The State was only an 
outer ditch, behind which there stood a 
p o w er fu l sy s tem  o f  fo r tr e s s e s  and  
earthworks .... ”  (Prison  N otebooks).
It followed that revolutionaries needed to 
direct their energies in the first place to the 
“ fortresses and earthworks” . Not as a 
substitute or an excuse for not tackling the 
state but as essential preparation for it - 
p rep a ra tion  w ith ou t w h ich  ta lk  o f  
overturning or “ smashing” the state became 
mere rhetoric covering practical impotence.
It should also be remembered that Gramsci 
wrote in the aftermath o f the first world war, 
and at a time when industrial development, 
state involvement in civil society and the 
power and sophistication o f the mass media 
were far less than they are today. In this light 
we would have to say that the tasks posed by 
Gramsci have increased.
But there are offsetting factors, now 
highlighted by the continuing economic 
crisis o f the capitalist world and the great 
range o f contradictions manifested in the 
many social movements and the intensity 
and breadth of class struggles.
There have also been changes in the 
state. The greater involvement o f the state in 
civil society is not a change in class nature. 
Even we in Australia who have not 
experienced directly wars and revolutions in 
our country know this from November 11, 
1975, for example.
The changes are that the state is much 
more involved than previously in education, 
s o c ia l w e lfa re , h o u s in g , tra n sp ort, 
communications and various forms of 
intervention in the economy.
A n d  d e s p it e  i d e o l o g i c a l l y  an d  
economically motivated efforts to cut back 
and hand some of it over to private enterprise 
where a profit can be made from it, state 
intervention remains massive. The very 
functioning of modern capitalist society, 
which it is the state’s business to maintain, 
requires it. The pre-occupation of various 
arms o f government with the “restructuring” 
of Australian capitalism to fit in with the 
requirements o f a world economy dominated 
by a few multinational empires only 
emphasises this.
Consequences flow ing from these 
developments include:
• The state has large numbers o f 
employees. Most of these, while having such 
privileges as a certain security in 
em ployment, have roughly the same 
standard of living as people “ outside” , and 
feel similar economic pressures. They are 
parts of bureaucratic structures run from the 
top down, with themselves on the bottom. To 
varying degrees they have to be closely in 
touch with ordinary people and their 
concerns.
Thus, many functionaries of the state can 
take up similar economic struggles to the 
people they “rule” . They can become 
“ infected” by similar concerns such as ideas 
of women’s liberation, opposition to uranium 
development, anti-authoritarianism, etc.
• The claimed “ impartiality” of the state, 
which is a vital ideological prop for the 
institution and the society it helps maintain, 
has to be given at least some lip-service. This 
creates some avenues for ideas and actions 
which don’t prop up the existing order. The 
Fraser government is going to great lengths 
to close up these avenues, but in doing so 
meets resistance and builds up pressures 
which will find vent later.
Looking more concretely at it, we could 
take the education system. This is an arm of 
the state which has the function o f providing 
the “ mix” of tractable industrial cannon- 
fodder, intellectuals, etc. required by the 
system. The study courses, the ideology 
conveyed and the form of organisation in
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schools is vital if this state function is to be 
discharged to the satisfaction  o f the 
capitalist system.
Having done a little teaching, I have 
experienced the anguish of having to fit in 
with and minister to these requirements. 
Nevertheless, the school system affords 
some avenues for progressive activity by 
teachers and pupils motivated by anti­
authoritarian feelings, opposition to sexism 
and racism, ideas o f the development o f the 
person, etc.
Some employees o f the Australian 
Broadcasting Commission have taken its 
professed impartiality at face value and 
presented ideas which have thrown the 
establishment into a rage. Axes have fallen 
since Fraser got in, but the possibilities of 
resistance have also been displayed.
Australia Post employees, workers in the 
telecommunications, transport and general 
administration fields have acted against the 
policies of the departments and commissions 
which head them.
Even some prison warders declared that 
they would not “ process” people arrested in 
anti-uranium demonstrations. This does not 
stop warders from beating up prisoners, or 
opposing most demands for prison reform, 
but it is still notable. All state employees 
experience to one degree or another their 
contradictory position w hich people 
involved have to concretely study. But the 
point is that is con trad ictory . The state is 
not a monolith.
There are even examples in history o f 
armies - the ultimate core of the state * being 
influenced by the prevailing social sentiment 
and political situation to refuse to fire on 
strikers. Magri, a critic from the left o f the 
Italian Communist Party, affirms that a 
section of police and judiciary in that country 
is aligned with the workers’ movement.
These examples bring out the fact that 
while the function of the state considered in 
the abstract remains always the same, the 
actual state is prey to all sorts o f 
contradictions. This creates the possibility 
for the state to be “neutralised” or rendered 
incapable of actually discharging this or 
that function under certain conditions. And 
this becomes the more possible the more 
preparation has gone on previously.
Sometimes (for example, 1968 in France) 
an eruption in one sector is likely to spark 
others, creating an upheaval that seems to 
come from nowhere, but spreads like wildfire 
because the smouldering contradictions are 
set alight.
Of course, this depends also and especially 
on the struggle in the non-state sector, in 
particular, industry.
The struggle for workers’ intervention and 
control goes on at all sorts o f levels. It is part 
of a constant struggle, o f which the fight 
over wages (over division of the value added 
in production between wages and profits) is 
one part. Or rather can  be part i f  not 
narrowly conducted.
Success is not likely to come out of the blue 
in finished form (such as “nationalisation 
under workers’ control” ). It has to be 
prepared for by more partial actions in which 
a working class political force is forged in 
actual struggle.
The particular forms such struggles take at a 
given time depend on circumstances and the 
degree of consciousness already attained, 
though the general nature of the demands 
advanced derive from analysis of economic 
and social tendencies and the particular 
sector or industry involved.
That is why A  N ew  C o u rse  fo r  
A ustralia puts stress on —
• Concrete programs which go beyond the 
immediate and seek to deal with 
economic and social trends seen from a 
class perspective.
• Grassroots involvement of the people 
concerned in working out and acting to 
achieve such concrete things, and their 
organisation in the process.
• A general framework of proposals on the 
econ om y  and s o c ia l l i fe  w h ich  
establishes links between the separate 
activities.
One small example is the way workers at 
Ajax Nettlefolds (which makes nuts, bolts, 
screws, etc.) intervened through a committee 
o f shop stewards in an Industries 
Commission inquiry into the industry.
They saved a number o f jobs, and while 
supporting the employers’ claim for a 
temporary increase in tariffs, took a quite 
independent class position which they stated 
in the following way:
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"We, as workers in the Ajax NeTtlefolds 
company, wish to state clearly that we are 
not seeking continued protection to make the 
company more profitable, as we believe their 
current profit level is more than adequate. 
We would be opposed to the Australian 
p eo p le  c a rry in g  th e burden  o f  an 
unnecessary, inefficien t and w asteful 
industry, simply to provide higher profits.
"We believe that the propositions we are 
putting forward are designed to create a more 
efficient and worthwhile industry, the 
benefits o f which must flow to the workers in 
the form o f shorter hours, better work 
environment and greater control over work 
organisation.
"In particular, we believe that a greater 
say in the overall workings and investment 
o f the company by the workers will assist in 
making it a more worthwhile and efficient 
company, producing for the social good. This 
will be greatly assisted by access to far more 
information, all o f which is perfectly 
reasonable when one considers the public 
support required to keep the company going.
"We fully understand that given the 
system we live in, it is difficult for any real 
rationalisation to develop, because o f the sole 
concern o f manufacturers to achieve the 
highest profit regardless of inefficiency and 
the good, o f workers.
" This is made even more difficult by the 
almost total absence o f a national plan for 
the manufacturing industry. Therefore, we 
strongly support the concept o f national 
planning that is based on the criteria o f 
socially useful and necessary production, 
benefits for workers that include adequate 
wages, working conditions and shorter 
hours, and that the industry is either 
economically viable or shown to be an 
essential part o f Australian manufacturing. 
We believe that the propositions we put 
forward for the fastener industry, if accepted, 
would head in the direction that is 
indicated. ”
Different and bigger examples of workers’ 
intervention can be found from the 
Australian green bans to the 1977 Fiat 
struggle in Italy, but the point is intervention 
from a class point of view, at a level suited to 
the circumstances.
In The State and R evolu tion  which he 
published in the second half o f 1917, Lenin
talked about other things besides violence, 
despite the fact that violence was very much 
to the fore in the conditions of the time.
The state consists, he pointed out, of a 
separate, a special body of people whose 
function it is to rule. The aim o f marxists in 
respect to the state is not to make it all 
powerful, but to “ do away” with it. That 
means to not have a special body of people 
whose job it is to manage and rule.
How can this be done? By having 
everyon e  partake of the function. We call 
this self-management, and see it as a great 
extension of democracy.
A “ democratic road to socialism" might 
therefore be briefly characterised as the 
process in which more and more people in 
more and more spheres o f social life act over 
things that affect them.
There are, of course, obstacles, including 
the conditions and habits o f an exploiting 
society.
"Owing to the conditions o f capitalist 
exploitation the modern wage-slaves are also 
so crushed by want and poverty that ‘they 
cannot be bothered with democracy’, 'they 
cannot be bothered with politics’; in the 
ordinary peaceful course o f events the 
majority o f the population is debarred from 
participating in social and political l i f e (S 
& R, Ch. 5, Part 2.)
P o v e r t y ,  i l l i t e r a c y  a n d  s o c ia l  
discrimination are still a big obstacle to 
Aborigines, migrants, the unemployed and 
those on very low incomes participating in 
democracy, but they are not insuperable. 
However, they are not now the obstacles to 
most people doing so, and it would be useful 
to discuss what the obstacles actually are. 
But the point is that none o f them are 
insuperable, that there are today more 
possibilities o f pushing out the boundaries of 
democracy.
“ To develop democracy to its log ica l 
conclusion , to find the form s for this 
development, to test them by practice, and so 
forth - all this is one o f the constituent tasks 
of the struggle for the social revolution. 
Taken separately, no sort o f democracy will 
bring socialism. But in actual life democracy 
will never be 'taken separately’; it will be 
‘taken together’ with other things, it will 
exert its influence on economics, will
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stimulate its reformation; and in its turn it 
will be influenced by economic development 
and so on. Such are the dialectics o f living 
history.” (S & R, Ch. 4, Part 4.)
As a dialectical process this is unlikely to 
proceed smoothly. Basic transformations do 
not occur without crises and upheavals, and 
we will return to this shortly.
But the “ quantitative”  process o f  
extending democracy and mass involvement 
is the crux of any “ democratic road to 
socialism” , the condition for any qualitative 
transformation taking place.
But, even here, sweeping generalisations 
should be avoided. Various aspects o f social 
change may be spread over lengthy periods 
of time. For example, “political power” 
changed suddenly in Cuba, but the other 
arms o f the state were only “smashed” at a 
later date. (I think in fact that in many cases 
it would be more accurate to say that they 
were “ reformed” , and that the process still 
continues. The word “smashed” can easily 
give rise to flights o f political fancy, far 
removed from the real tasks.)
As to the type of “ upheaval” envisaged, 
“ the democratic road to socialism” involves 
a commitment to try to avoid civil war.
The CPA’s Program Principles, which will 
guide the development o f its general 
program, state on this point:
“ The fundamental sources of social 
violence are capitalist exploitation, the ideas 
based on it, and authoritarianism enshrined 
in the state. Nevertheless, the CPA aims for 
socialist transformation of society without 
civil war, striving to utilise all the 
contradictions within society, the state and 
the ru lin g  c la sse s  n a tio n a lly  and  
internationally to this end, and seeking the 
support o f other socialist and liberation 
forces throughout the world.
“ This requires consistent defence of 
people’s interests and rights, opposition to 
authoritarianism, including in our own 
practice, opposition to ‘legal violence’, and 
promotion o f the positive ideals of socialism 
and communism which envisage and require 
a great expansion o f democratic rights.”
This direction is the CPA’s choice, as the 
only viable way to proceed in our society. But 
for others who make a different choice we 
point out that an alternative is not created
just by “ choosing” . To imagine that the kind 
o f struggle the “ democratic road”  involves is 
impossible in Australia, while the kind of 
struggle involved in an insurrection is 
possible, is to indulge in fantasy.
In Spain and Italy, which are far more 
“political” societies than our own, with long 
revolutionary histories, even critics from the 
left of the communist parties (Magri, 
G iacom o) acknowledge that anyone 
advocating to the workers that they take up 
arms and launch a civil war would be 
laughed out o f court, if not subjected to more 
material criticism.
This leads to questions about likelihoods 
and possibilities. These questions should be 
discussed free o f rhetoric and dogma, but 
they are legitimate and important to discuss.
Drawing lessons from the coup in Chile, 
Enrico Berlinguer, secretary of the Italian 
Communist Party, pointed to the need for 
broad alliances, of avoiding a split “down the 
middle” of society, and advanced the aim of 
winning “ the vast majority” for a policy o f 
"democratic renewal” .
The “ historic com prom ise”  which 
envisaged the winning of at least a section of 
Christian Democrats was related to this 
perspective. (The C-D’s are the conservative 
ruling party, but the party played a positive 
role in the struggle against fascism and has 
the allegiance o f about one-third of industrial 
workers.)
The limited support the PCI gave the C-D 
government, and the struggle for first, a 
communist voice, then a com m unist 
presence in the government derived from this 
aim.
Even though he disagrees with the PCI 
over the “ historic compromise” and other 
issues, Lucio Magri, one o f the founders of 
the II Manifesto group,affirms the necessity 
of using to the full the “ democratic terrain” 
which —
“ .... means using all the opportunities that 
bourgeois democracy offers, for example, the 
opportunities for union struggles, the 
openings created by the articulation of state 
power, local government agencies, the co­
operatives. One must use all these  
opportunities rather than think o f building 
only a. vanguard which then uses a moment 
of crisis to conquer power in a violent way.
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The problem o f violence remains, bul only as 
defensive violence in reaction to attempts by 
the bourgeoisie during the course o f the cris is 
to overturn democratic forms - this is already 
happening and will increase.”  (Socialist 
R evolution , No. 36.)
There is no sure-fire way o f being 
sufficiently prepared for every turn o f events 
or for such an eventuality, but it is important 
not to ignore these aspects, even though no 
other approach than the one outlined here 
seems viable for countries like our own. I am 
sure that the PCI (for instance) is quite well 
aware of the theory of the state, the problems 
and the dangers.
But I would like to make two points.
Firstly, it appears at the time of writing 
that the CP and other parties of the left could 
form a left government, something the PCI 
had wished to avoid. This would pose the 
problem of a society divided roughly down 
the middle politically, and o f the communists 
as the m a jor  partn er ta k in g  the 
responsib ility  for administering Italian 
society which remains capitalist.
Because of the development of the world 
capitalist economy and the power of the 
multinational corporations, actions by the 
latter can be consciously undertaken to 
“destabilise” any society. Such actions 
would no doubt be countered by further 
political mobilisation, further controls over 
or confiscations of property and capital, co­
operation with movements in France, Spain, 
Portugal and other measures. But the living 
standards o f the people could fall, creating 
severe hardships and political difficulties. 
The issue at each step is decided by the 
strength and skill of the forces in struggle, it 
is not decided one w ay  o r  the other in 
advance.
This leads to my second point: that while it 
may be entirely correct to reject the road of 
insurrection in which a vanguard seeks to 
seize power in a crisis, and consider only 
counter-violence, the latter has to be taken 
seriously. And sometimes it is not, because 
all gaze is directed one way.
I visited Chile in 1965 to represent the CPA 
at the 13th Congress of the Communist Party 
o f Chile. This was one year after the 1964 
elections in which A lle n d e  stood for 
President as the Left candidate. He received
39 per cent of the votes, but lost because 
there was a single opposing candidate, Frei.
When I arrived in Chile there was still a 
lively debate going on as to whether the same 
policy should be continued. It was, and at the 
election in 1970 Allende, with 36.3 per 
cent of the vote became President because the 
opposition was split and he got the highest 
vote of any candidate.
But during the 1965 discussion, partly 
acting as “ devil’ s advocate”  I posed 
questions about the dangers, using among 
other examples the bloody overthrow in 
April 1964 o f the much milder President 
Goulart o f Brazil.
I was assured that this possibility was 
always in mind, that preparations were 
being made for such an eventuality, and that 
while they had no illusions about it in the 
final analysis, the tradition o f  non­
interference in civil affairs by the Chilean 
army (very different from the armed forces of 
other Latin American countries) was of 
significance.
But CPC secretary Luis Corvalan had this 
to say at a Central Committee meeting in 
August 1977, not long after his release in a 
prisoner exchange between Chile and the 
Soviet Union!
“ .... toleration o f the excesses of the counter­
revolutionaries constitutes a capital error.
“ The line o f Popular Unity and President 
Allende o f relying upon the democratic 
sectors of the Armed Forces sought a 
growing identification o f the military with 
the people, but it was not pursued to the core.
(there were considerable difficulties in 
changing top personnel in the armed forces 
but) “in spite o f this, we could and should 
have promoted at least some changes and 
eliminated some o f the most reactionary 
elements, seeking the support o f the sectors 
most inclined towards the new regime. This 
was especially possible in the first months, 
as well as just after the municipal elections in 
1971, and following the tanzaco”  (the 
abortive coup of June 29, 1973).
The behavior o f the Government and 
Popular Unity in this field if os undoubtedly 
influenced by erroneous conceptions deeply 
rooted in the Chilean mentality which, in one 
way or another, to a greater or lesser extent, 
affected all parties. Obviously, we are
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referring to the belief that the armed forces o f 
C hile w ere d is tin g u ish ed  by  th e ir  
subordination to the Civil Power and by their 
abstention from politics and sense of 
p rofess iona lism.
“ ....despite all the errors or insufficiencies of
our work with the armed forces, there were 
among the latter .... important contingents 
on whom we could have counted whatever 
the circumstances .... We ascertained this in 
our contacts with military personnel at all 
levels. However, the deterioration in the 
correlation o f forces also had repercussions 
on the armed institutions and the aforesaid 
contingents were reduced and felt confused, 
frustrated and helpless. This u>as the basic 
thing. Added to it was the fact that neither 
the Government nor Popular Unity had 
elaborated an operational plan - worthy of 
the name - with loyal military personnel to 
crush a coup d ’etat were it unleashed. Thus 
came the llth  o f September. The coup caught 
us unprepared with regard to military 
defence. ”
Corvalan then goes on to outline some 
actual preparations o f the CPC. They had 
organised about 3,000 members with one 
degree or another o f training and a quantity 
o f armaments, but the amount was 
inadequate and the military conceptions 
involved were far too primitive.
The enemy, he further says, knew that 
there were some preparations, so instead of 
the “ traditional” rather unorganised coup 
which might have been repelled and defeated 
like the one in June, they launched, with CIA 
assistance, a full-scale military blitzkrieg 
which allowed no time for political and 
military mobilisation of other forces.
The fact that such frank self-criticism is 
made gives credibility (of course, not proof) to 
another conclusion advanced by Corvalan. 
He affirms that the slogan o f the Popular 
Unity “ No to Civil War” was correct. It had 
the objective of uniting as many forces as 
possible and also expressed the conviction - 
which the CPC leadership still holds - that 
the correlation of political forces would have 
been changed fo r  the w orse  by any other 
slogan, because the masses were not 
prepared to follow another road. The 
consciousness of a party can influence that 
of the masses, but it cannot necessarily 
determine it.
This has little to do with our own situation 
at present, but maybe an analogy can be 
drawn.
In correctly (as I believe) focussing at 
present on the arduous nature of the tasks we 
face, and recognising the conservatism of 
large sections o f  Australian society, 
including considerable numbers o f workers, 
we should not lose sight o f the possibility - 
indeed, in the long run, inevitability - of 
crises, upsurges and upheavals of various 
kinds.
It is wrong to count on upheavals coming 
at a time we cannot know, possibly quite far 
away, as a substitute for the hard, patient 
work we must put in today. But it is also 
wrong to lose perspective and get into the 
habit of thinking that things will always go 
on in the same way and at the same pace.
The contradictions in modem capitalism 
in general are many and chronic. Australia 
is no exception and has also its own 
particular weaknesses as well as strengths. 
One or another o f these contradictions can 
easily become acute and erupt, transforming 
the situation in which we work. If our gaze is 
too fixedly one way, this would find us 
wanting.
It has been put to me that the reason the 
Latrobe valley strike did not result in the 
public backlash many o f us expected was 
that, with the mass movement at a low ebb 
and reaction riding pretty high, a deep chord 
o f sympathy was struck for a body of solid 
people, running their own thing. If this is so, 
then in altered circumstances, a rapid 
resurgence of the ideas and movements now 
b ein g  pushed dow n by  the F raser 
government could occur.
The “Dictatorship of 
the Proletariat”
Discussion of “ the democratic road to 
socialism” leads naturally to consideration 
of “ the dictatorship of the proletariat” .
This phrase is so overlaid with past 
controversies, em otions, obscurities, 
different interpretations and popular 
antipathy, that little w ill come from 
denouncing it as outmoded or passionately 
asserting that one must stick to it or forever 
be condemned as an opportunist. Balibar,
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in his book, does not avoid the latter 
approach, but he does the positive service of 
pointing out that the issue iB concerned with 
the w h o le  t r a n s it io n  p e r io d  from 
capitalism to communism.
Rather than be taken up with phrases and 
slogans, therefore, it is better to pose this 
q u estion : w hat are the e ssen tia l 
characteristics o f such a transition period?
I would say there are three:
1. There must be a fundamental change in 
the economy away from domination by 
the corporations; and in the state, in 
which capitalist rule is embodied 
politically.
2. There must be a new state to help effect 
and preserve the economic and political 
changes which this entails.
3. This state must be in principle different 
from any previous one. Different in that 
it will not be, or aim to preserve, a 
separate, distinct group o f people whose 
special function is to manage and rule.
It will be of this new type because, and to 
the extent that, everyone performs some part 
o f the work o f “ruling” , which means to the 
extent that self-management develops. The 
new state will thus progressively do away 
with itself, or “ wither away” .
The connection between this and the 
democratic road to socialism will be evident. 
It is an essential preparation for the future 
society and in that sense represents a 
necessary preparation of the new within the 
shell of the old. Not in the sense that the new 
will be born without some sort o f upheaval, 
but that an upheaval of the kind required will 
not take place without that preparation.
So far, so good, some might say. But that is 
the dictatorship of the proletariat. But this is 
much too pat, I believe, and leaves too many 
unanswered questions. It ignores lessons 
from historical experience which marxists 
must pay heed to, rather than proceeding 
from categories and concepts as though they 
were eternal truths.
After the initial wave which brings a new 
society and state into being, one of the chief 
problems is that differences arise within the 
working class (however defined) and 
between the working class and other sections 
o f the people.
These differences arise from many causes, 
and may become the subject o f intense 
struggles, affecting the stability or even the 
very existence of the new society.
As differences arise, the question is “ who 
will dictate to whom?”
Socialist history shows that some will 
claim that theirs is the “ proletarian line”  and 
that the others are “ capitalist roaders", even 
if they are socially proletarians. Such 
accusations usually include the claim that 
non-proletarians or former exploiters 
support those denounced. But it is not 
unknown for the positions to be reversed a bit 
later. So who should “ dictate” to whom?
Will those who, at the time, actually 
constitute or control the state power decide 
who possesses the truth, decide which line is 
right (presumably their own) and use their 
hold on state power to ‘ ‘dictate”  to the others?
Of course, the more self-management 
exists, the more the state will have “ withered 
away” , leaving it to democratic processes to 
decide. Therefore, the further the processes 
described as essential to the democratic road 
to socialism have proceeded, the more the 
problem will be mitigated. But it is idealistic 
to imagine that it will be finally “ solved” . 
And in any case, even with developed self­
management, there will be differences, and 
probably quite strong ones at that, between 
different enterprises and sectors on various 
social questions.
Therefore, socialists’ commitment to 
democratic processes is, and will continue to 
be, a real issue.
The CPA’s commitment is to a plurality of 
parties (that is, of their right to exist), that 
the state should not have an official ideology 
or a m onopoly over the media, and 
recognition o f the right of people to vote out a 
government as well as to vote one in 
(w h atever the system  o f  e le ctin g  
representatives). To state this does not, o f 
course, provide for all contingencies, but it 
expresses our firm commitment. We have to 
m ean it, and people - including and 
especially “ the “proletariat” - have to be 
convinced that we do.
That is why I think “ socialist democracy” 
which links up with the democratic road to 
socialism is a more accurate, not to say 
intelligible, way of stating our position.
ECONOMIC 
NOTES
It’s three years since the current recession 
hit Australia. No post-war econom ic 
downturn has been so severe or lasted so 
long.
Perhaps for this reason, but also because 
no-one likes to be too pessimistic, economic 
debate in Australia at the moment mainly 
consists o f pious wishes rather than 
hardh ead ed  a n a ly s is . P o lit ic ia n s , 
businessmen and economists are hard at 
work trying to talk the economy into a 
recovery but so far with little success. One 
reason, o f course, is that Australia is plugged 
into the still depressed world economy.
Econom ic debate in Australia has 
traditionally ignored this simple fact. It has 
been thought that keeping the economy 
humming is the main job of the government 
of the day; conversely, if anything goes 
d ra s tica lly  w ron g , it m ust be the 
government’s fault.
The Labor Opposition ran just such a line 
every time the economy faltered between 
1949 and 1972. In fact, they were so 
successful in convincing people o f this that 
when they eventually won office and had to 
handle Australia’s most serious economic 
downturn since the 1930s the voters knew 
exactly who to blame.
While it was in office, Labor pleaded that 
both aspects o f the recession - first soaring 
prices and then growing unemployment -
had international causes. But the excuse 
sounded lame, even to the Party’s own 
supporters.
If anything, last December’s election result 
shows that many voters still blame Labor for 
the recession. The Fraser government, for its 
part, is banking on the same psychology 
working in reverse when the recovery comes. 
So long as the government hangs on and 
sounds confident they’ll get the credit for the 
eventual recovery and govern till the end of 
the century with the continuing support of a 
thankful electorate.
At least that’s the strategy. It could come 
unstuck, of course, if there is no recovery 
internationally. This is why any survey o f 
Australia’s economic prospects and the 
political future we can expect must start with 
the international economy.
An Inside Story
The latest and most authoritative survey 
of the world capitalist economy from within, 
as it were, can be found in the Organisation 
fo r  E c o n o m ic  C o -o p e r a t io n  an d  
Development’s E conom ic O utlook  22, 
published in December last year.
“The pick-up in activity in late 1976 and 
early 1977 was short-lived” , the OECD 
points out in a survey o f developments since 
the recession. “ Total OECD growth 
weakened markedly in the second quarter of
1977 and has since remained sluggish.
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Industrial production has broadly stagnated 
since April. In the United States there has 
been some slowing down, and in Japan 
industrial output is flat.”
The immediate consequence: worsening 
unemployment. “Total unemployment in the 
area” , the Organisation reports, “ is now 
about 16.3 million, some half a million higher 
than the trough of the 1975 recession.
“ In Europe, unlike the united States, 
unemployment has in fact been rising 
constantly, from 4.7 million at the beginning 
o f 1975 to over 7 million today. In many 
countries the weakness of the labor market 
has led to an actual fall in employment and a 
rise in the under-utilisation o f employees.”
This year will make things worse, the 
OECD predicts, with unemployment at the 
end o f 1978 reaching 17 million.
The good news is that the inflationary 
surge that hit the capitalist world in the early 
1970s is now receding, though inflation is 
still running at twice to three times its pre­
recession rate.
Consumer prices in the OECD area rose at 
an annual rate o f 6 per cent in the four 
months to October - markedly better, as the 
Organisation points out, than the 11 percent 
registered earlier in 1977.
Unfortunately, food prices — partly for 
seasonal reasons — have been the most 
important factor contributing to the better 
performance o f most countries which means 
further cuts in inflation are not assured.
The problem, the OECD believes, goes 
back to weakening output. Inflation through
1978 should average 7 per cent, compared 
with 8 per cent over the whole of 1977 and 8 
per cent also in 1976. An improvement, 
perhaps, but hardly a dramatic one.
These present forecasts, the OECD warns, 
“ assume no marked deterioration in 
business or consumer confidence, and this 
might be optimistic for most countries in 
view o f the current weakness in both 
domestic demand and foreign trade” .
‘A particular source of risk’
“ Demand trends are weak almost 
everywhere, In the absence o f new policy 
action, therefore, there could be an important 
downside risk in the forecast. A particular
source o f risk is the possibility that the 
pattern of international payments which 
seems implicit in the demand and output 
prospects would not, in fact, prove 
supportable.”
This is a very careful way o f saying that 
the world monetary system faces a new crisis 
that is at least as serious as the one that set 
off the last bout of inflation.
Again, the culprit is the American dollar.
Since much o f the world’s trade is done in 
US dollars and since many countries hold 
their foreign reserves in American currency, 
everyone has a stake in the health o f the 
dollar. And right now, it is looking pretty 
sick.
The irony is that the United States was the 
only capitalist country to significantly 
expand production last year, but it was just 
such an expansion that set o ff the dollar 
crisis.
When the US economy picked up and 
unemployment fell slightly from 7.8 per cent 
to 7.0 per cent, Americans began buying 
again. Imports soared, swollen by a $45 
billion oil bill. However, other countries, with 
thousands o f their own workers still 
unemployed, refused to buy American 
exports.
The US last year spent $30 billion more on 
imports than it earnt by exporting. The $30 
billion, of course, ended up overseas, swelling 
the already massive pool of US dollars held 
by foreigners to an awesome $300 billion. 
Naturally, the dollar’s value began to slide, 
falling,for example, 12 per cent against the 
Deutschmark over the year.
‘A fully-fledged depression’
Non-Americans holding dollars began to 
get nervous. “The fall ofthe dollar” , warned 
editor Theo Sommer o f the leading West 
German daily D ie Zeit, “ if unchecked, 
would plunge Europe into a fully-fledged 
depression. The political dislocations in 
countries like France would be grave.
“ Such a failure would quickly turn a 
monetary crisis into a crisis of confidence 
that will shake the foundations of the 
Western system.”
While this may sound exaggerated it 
certainly highlights a real problem other
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■ countries haven’t learnt to deal with. After 
all, the last time the world was flooded with 
US dollars was during the Viet Nam war. 
America wanted to finance its unpopular 
military adventures without raising taxes. 
Instead, it printed dollars and pumped them 
into the world monetary system, setting off 
an unprecedented inflation. All currencies 
were affected, including A ustralia ’s. 
Everyone paid for America’s war.
Now a similar thing is happening. As US 
dollars flood the world and drop in value, it 
becomes easier for the US to sell its exports 
overseas - and harder for other countries to 
sell in the US. Thus, the US is actually better 
off, which is why President Carter has held 
off so long before intervening to support the 
dollar.
It was only very strong international 
pressure that forced Washington to start 
buying up dollars with its own foreign 
currency reserves and so stem the slide in the 
dollar’s value.
At the same time, the US Federal Reserve 
Board raised the interest rate it charges 
member banks by half a per cent to 
encourage all US rates upwards and so 
attract more capital from abroad.
These moves were lauded in Western 
Europe but clearly will check American 
domestic economic growth. For example, the 
“ prime” bank rate on business loans is now 8 
per cent compared with 6 Vi per cent at the 
beginning of last year, and Wall Street 
predicts it will go to 9% or even 9 per cent by 
the end of 1978, according to Tim e, January 
30.
“The rise makes it more expensive for 
consumers and businesses to buy or build 
with borrowed cash” , Tim e explains. “ It 
could put an end to the housing boom by 
causing savers to pull their money out of 
savings banks — the prime source of 
mortgage loans — and instead buy Treasury 
bills or bonds to get the higher interest rates 
that they offer.”
US domestic inflation is now picking up 
again, averaging 7.25 per cent over the last 
four months o f last year. While this may 
sound good by Australian standards, it, in 
fact, represents a serious reverse: inflation in 
the US is now higher than it was two years 
ago and is predicted to go higher still. It
seems that even the most powerful economy 
in the world cannot begin to recover without 
setting off new inflationary pressures that 
must, by the nature of things, flow through to 
other, dependent economies.
Another source of instability
While US domestic developments are one 
source of instability for the international 
monetary system, another, perhaps more 
intractable, problem involves the under­
developed countries.
According to the OECD those developing 
countries which import oil saw their overseas 
debt rise from $90 billion at the end of 1973 to 
$170 billion at the end of 1976. At the same 
time, the interest they had to pay on these 
loans went from $13 billion each year to over 
$25 billion. US Senator Javits predicts these 
debts will reach $380 billion in five years and 
$540 billion in ten years.
“This will break the back of any system, 
including this system” , Senator Javits said, 
referring to the institutions that regulate 
international finance.
While the under-developed countries are 
more and more heavily in debt to other 
countries and to international agencies, the 
really dramatic growth has been in their 
debts to international banks.
As the OECD puts it: “ The international 
banking community has so far shown a 
remarkable willingness and ability to act as 
financial intermediary between the 
surpluses o f  the petroleum exporting 
countries and the borrowing needs o f the 
developing (and some developed) countries.”
These oil surpluses — currently running at 
about $40 billion a year — are the amounts 
the oil producing countries receive for their 
oil over and above what they are able to 
spend on imports. Due to their small 
populations and backward social systems, 
these countries only import a limited 
quantity of goods. The rest of the money they 
make out of oil is merely deposited in US and 
European private banks.
This money is then re-lent. Because of the 
world recession, the banks’ main customers, 
the big corporations, have not needed funds 
for expansion. The banks, therefore, have 
been falling over themselves to lend their 
surpluses to other borrowers and in
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particular to non-oil producing under­
developed countries who desperately need 
funds to pay for imports — especially oil, for 
which they, too, have to pay higher prices.
Thus, while commercial and industrial 
loans of the eight largest New York banks 
increased only 1,8 per cent to $33.8 billion 
during the year to June 1977, foreign lending 
jumped 26.1 per cent to $71.2 billion in the 
same period.
In 1960, private “ hard”  loans - in other 
words, loans at market rates o f interest to 
private banks - made up only 16.7 per cent of 
the debt of developing countries. Now the 
proportion is 36.2 per cent. Interest payable 
to private banks has gone up even faster, 
now constituting 42,8 per cent of these 
countries’ massive debt service charges.
For many o f them, interest payments take 
over a quarter o f all export earnings and for 
some much more: Brazil, for example, will 
have to spend 44 per cent o f all its export 
earnings this year, just to pay interest on its 
debts.
The private multinational banks, of 
course, are in it for the money. While the 
proportion of their total funds that they lend 
to under-developed countries varies between 
Chase M anhattan’s 12 per cent and 
Citicorp’s 22 per cent, the proportion of their 
profits which they derive from this source is 
much greater. Foreign earnings o f the 
thirteen US com m ercial banks have 
increased from 34 per cent o f total earnings 
in 1973 to nearly 50 per cent in 1975. Later 
figures are no doubt higher.
But how long can it go on?
A study by American Express says that 
one out o f every two dollars borrowed by the 
under-developed countries in 1980 will have 
to be spent just paying interest on old loans. 
A US Senate study on “ International Debt, 
the Banks and US Foreign Policy” predicts 
that these countries “ will find it more in their 
interest to simply default or repudiate their 
external debts rather than to have to 
continue borrowing just to repay old loans” .
“ And if this happens” , the study goes on, 
“a domino effect could take place in which 
other debtor countries follow suit, the banks 
panic and start calling in their international 
loans, the stock market falls precipitously 
and the international capital market 
collapses.
“This doomsday scenario may be extreme 
in its pessimism, but it is being taken 
seriously enough by responsible officials 
that a concerted international effort is now 
under way to prevent that first domino from 
falling.”
Part of this “ international effort” consists 
of forcing under-developed countries 
borrowing from private banks to fulfill the 
sorts o f  s tr in g en t co n d it io n s  the 
International Monetary Fund lays down 
before it will give official loans.
The IMF has been able to force recipient 
countries to cut back social services, hold 
down living standards and impose other 
austerity measures as conditions for official 
loans. As the OECD points out, one reason 
under-developed countries prefer private 
loans even before they have exhausted their 
credit facilities with the IMF is that the 
banks up till now haven’t imposed such 
conditions.
But this has to change, the OECD argues: 
“ Debt relief should be accompanied by an 
effective stabilisation program on the part of 
the debtor country, preferably in the context 
o f an IMF standby undertaking.” In other 
words, the IMF will bail out the private 
banks if the banks in turn impose the same 
austerity measures as conditions for future 
loans.
The banks, however, are caught in a trap. 
If they reverse their liberal, profit-hungry 
criteria for future loans they might trigger off 
a series o f defaults. Once this has happened 
where will it end? Better, perhaps, to keep 
lending. '
This instability in the international 
monetary system has persisted through the 
recession and could well upset any recovery 
in world production or trade. The US 
experience suggests any upturn will be at the 
cost of future inflation. If this inflation is 
immediately transmitted through the 
system, future prospects for places like 
Australia are not nearly as bright as our own 
recent inflation history suggests.
We may, in fact, be taken for another 
inflation ride before we recover from the 
present one.
T. O’S., 8.2.78.
CHINA 
AFTER 
MAO
PETER 
NOLAN
The months preceding and following the 
death of Mao Tse-tung in September o f last 
year witnessed a series o f political events 
that, even by China’s standards, were quite 
exceptional. Is it possible at this relatively 
early stage to come to some preliminary 
understanding o f their significance in 
respect to the course of China’s political
economy in the foreseeable future? It is to 
that task that this article is addressed.
Let me begin by refreshing readers’ 
memories of some o f the major events o f the 
past year and a half. 1976, that ‘most 
extraordinary year in the history o f our 
Party’ (Hua Kuo-feng) began disastrously 
with the death in January of Premier Chou 
En-lai; it was on his experienced shoulders 
that many people both inside and outside 
China thought rested the chances of a 
peaceful transition to the ‘post-Mao epoch’. 
Hua Kuo-feng, a relative newcomer to the 
senior ranks of the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP), who had only gained his place 
in the Politburo in 1973, was appointed 
Acting Premier, apparently on Mao’s 
recommendation. In April came the violent 
riots in Tien An Men Square in Peking, 
closely followed by the dismissal of Teng 
Hsiao-ping from all his official positions 
including Vice-Chairman of the Central 
Committee of the CCP, Vice-Premier, and 
Chief of the General Staff of the People’s 
Liberation Army. Teng, the man who had 
said that it didn’t matter whether a cat was 
black or white as long as it could catch mice, 
was again attacked as he had been during 
the Cultural Revolution for allegedly trying 
to ‘restore capitalism’ in China. The 
immediate beneficiary o f Teng’s dismissal 
was Hua Kuo-feng, who was appointed 
Premier and first Vice-Chairman o f the CCP 
(a newly-created position). A  short period of 
relative calm was ended in early July by the 
death of veteran leader Chu Teh, and 
shattered at the end o f the month by the 
terrible earthquake in Tangshan. On 
September 9 Mao died.
Few outside observers had not predicted 
that a power struggle of some kind would 
occur after his death. It was clear that the 
dismissal of Teng was but the tip of the 
iceberg, and that a widespread struggle had 
been taking place throughout the country 
during the period leading up to Mao’s death. 
However, virtually no one was prepared for 
the swiftness or the drama with which the 
issue was ‘resolved’ by the arrest on October 
of the ‘radical’ group in the Politburo: 
Chiang Ching, Chang Chun-chiao, Yao Wen- 
yuan and Wang Hung-wen, collectively 
dubbed the ‘Gang o f Four’.
The purge o f the ‘radical’ elements at the 
top of the Party made it immediately obvious 
that China’s political economy had sharply
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changed course, and a succession of speeches 
and articles published since then have 
simply confirmed that impression: instead of 
policy being the outcome o f a ‘struggle 
between two lines’ held together in a 
dynamic tension by Chairman Mao, his 
death has permitted one ‘line’ to overwhelm 
the other. The formal conclusion of this 
process has occurred in recent months. The 
3rd plenary session of the 10th Central 
Committee met in July o f this year and 
officially confirmed the appointment of Hua 
Kuo-feng as Chairman o f the Central 
Committee of the CCP and Chairman of the 
M ilitary Com m ission o f  the Central 
Committee of the CCP. It also announced the 
full restoration of Teng Hsiao-ping to all his 
posts. Further, it decided to take the drastic 
step o f expelling the Gang o f Four from the 
CCP ‘once and for all’ . A national Party 
Congress was rapidly organised and met on 
August 12-18: it was the 11th Congress in the 
Party’s history but only the 4th since 
liberation. The congress ‘fully approved’ the 
measures taken to smash the Gang, and 
‘unanimously adopted’ a resolution to 
support the new Party line as summarised in 
Hua’s political report to the congress. It 
elected a new Central Committee and 
Politburo, and it concluded with the 
optimistic hope that it would usher in a 
period o f ‘stability and unity and great order 
across the land’,
POLITICS
Is it likely that such a period of stability 
and unity will occur? A central question here 
concerns the strength of support for the 
Gang inside the CCP and the strategy they 
are likely to adopt. A factor of major 
importance in assessing the strength of 
inner-Party support for the Gang is the rapid 
increase in the size of the CCP since the 
Cultural Revolution. It has roughly doubled 
its total membership since the early 1960s to 
its present size of 35 million. Nearly one-half 
of these members have joined since the 
Cultural Revolution, and over 7 million since 
the 10th Party Congress in 1973. (1)
There is little doubt that a significant 
proportion o f these new members have been 
selected because of their sympathy with the 
aims of the Gang. Yeh Chien-ying, Party 
Vice-Chairman and Defence Minister, in his 
speech  in trod u c in g  the new P arty  
Constitution, admitted that there is a
‘serious problem o f impurity in ideology, 
organisation and style o f work among Party 
members as a result of the rather extensive 
confusion created by the “Gang of Four” who 
in recent years vitiated the Party’s 
organisational principle and set their own 
standards for Party membership .... There 
are definitely quite a few such Party 
members’. (2)
How does the top leadership propose to 
deal with this situation? In the short run the 
immediate task has been to reconstitute 
leading bodies of the Party at all levels and 
remove the Gang’s supporters. Under these 
new leading bodies the Party will naturally 
have altered its policy over the kind o f people 
it recruits. In addition, there has been 
instituted a much stricter system of control 
over new recruits, all o f them now being 
obliged to go through a one-year minimum 
probationary period. (3) An extensive 
‘rectification’ is under way inside the party 
‘to expose and criticise the Gang’. Those who 
can be educated and won over will be treated 
leniently with the objective o f ‘isolating to 
the maximum the “Gang of Four” and the 
handful o f their sworn supporters’: on these 
the Party will ‘concentrate its blows’. A 
powerful attempt is being made to tighten up 
inner-Party control in the wake of the 
struggles of the recent past, the most obvious 
m anifestation o f  which is the new 
‘commissions for inspecting discipline’. The 
evidence so far available indicates that the 
leadership has been successful in preventing 
an open split within the Party despite the 
hard struggles that have gone on over the 
past year. This seems to suggest that the 
‘hard core’ supporters of the gang do 
constitute a m inority, albeit a most 
significant one, who can be isolated from the 
majority. Furthermore, those who still 
support the G ang’s position may be 
unwilling to push their disagreement to the 
point where they severely disrupt economic 
and social life for a considerable period. In 
addition, the Gang’s supporters no longer 
have control of the mass media, and under 
such circumstances it is far harder for them 
to orchestrate any campaign of action, if 
they did desire to mount one.
W hat o f  the lon g -ru n ?  Hua has 
acknowledged the importance of the task of 
combating the ideological impact o f the 
Gang: ‘not only must we settle accounts with 
the gang in the sphere of political and
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organisational line, we must also conduct 
criticism  on the theoretical plane o f 
philosophy, political economy, and scientific 
socialism, so as to eradicate their pernicious 
influence from every sphere’. (4)
The long-run impact of the Gang is 
difficult to assess. Their great strength lay in 
the commanding positions they occupied in 
the mass media which enabled their ideas to 
have a wide circulation. What is important to 
know is the degree to which their ideas have 
influenced, and in the future may influence, 
serious radical forces within China. The 
predominant view held by observers in the 
West at the moment seems to be that the 
Gang do indeed deserve the epithets being 
heaped upon them by Chinese leaders. Are 
they indeed to be dismissed as opportunistic 
‘anarchists’ whose ‘metaphysical idealism’ 
is currently being exposed in its true light to 
the Chinese people, or do their views 
represent a deeper and more thorough-going 
critique o f the transitional period in post­
revolutionary poor countries?
A great deal o f literature, mostly in 
Chinese, has been produced by the Gang and 
it is most important that a serious analysis of 
their work is undertaken. Before that is done 
any judgm ents must necessarily be 
tentative. However, some points can be 
made. Firstly, we should not take the 
undoubted personal unpleasantness, 
ambition and hypocrisy o f Chiang Ching, 
Mao’s wife, as characteristic of the whole 
movement. The briefest comparison o f the 
writings of Chiang Ching with those of 
Chang Chua-chiao, for example, indicates 
the much greater sophistication of the latter. 
Moreover, we should remember that the 
G ang’s supporters really were very 
num erous, and a g a in , the b r ie fest  
acquaintance with their main theoretical 
journal Study and Criticism  indicates that 
a m o n g  th e ir  n u m b e r  w ere  m a n y  
sophisticated and intelligent writers who 
were making a serious analysis of the 
emerging problems of China’s political 
economy: beneath the frothy surface of 
political debate lies some hard thinking, and 
perhaps the long-run impact of the Gang 
may be greater than some imagine.
PARTY, STATE AND SOCIETY
A central question o f concern in critical 
th in k in g  about p os t-rev o lu tion a ry
transformation in poor countries has been 
the role to be played by the communist party. 
There does not appear to be a great deal of 
difference between the Gang and the current 
Chinese leaders regarding the necessity for 
the Party to maintain a strong leadership 
role at all levels of organised social life. The 
main areas o f dispute between the Gang and 
their opponents have centred around the 
kind of people who should be admitted to the 
Party and the policies that the party should 
pursue rather than the necessity to have a 
strong ‘vanguard’ party.
Is there any evidence that the Gang and 
their opponents were in substantial 
disagreement about the relationship o f the 
masses to the state apparatus? It is worth 
recalling here that for a short period o f time 
during the Cultural Revolution, radical 
forms o f popular participation in state 
administration, which did involve a real 
diminution of Party control, and which used 
the paris Commune as their model, were 
widely discussed, and were briefly 
implemented in some parts of China in 1967. 
(5) However, instead o f rule by direct 
representatives of the mass o f workers, 
compromise institutions - ‘revolutionary 
committees’ - were quickly introduced. On 
these, popular representatives shared power 
with Party and Army members, and were 
soon condemned as ‘bourgeois reformism’ by 
the ultra-Left in China. (6) Since then the 
‘revolutionary committees’ at levels above 
the production unit have been removed even 
further from the Paris Commune ideal of 
directly elected representatives subject to 
mass supervision and recall. (7) The issue of 
p o p u la r  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  in  s t a t e  
administration has certainly not been 
absent from the writings of the Gang and 
their supporters, but in translated sources it 
has not appeared as a prominent theme. If 
substantial divergences o f view between the 
Gang and their opponents on these 
issues have existed they have not been easily 
observable from outside China.
What of the policies likely to be pursued in 
other areas? Their general character is 
clearly indicated in Hua’s report to the 11th 
Party Congress in which he announced that 
the smashing o f the Gang marked ‘the 
triumphant conclusion of our first great 
Proletarian Cultural Revolution’. Instead of 
disruptive activities o f  the Cultural
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Revolution type, Hua emphasised that the 
period ahead will be one o f stability and 
order in which the main stress will be placed 
on transforming China into ‘a great, 
powerful and modem socialist country in the 
last quarter of the 20th century’. In 1966 at 
the beginning o f the Cultural Revolution, 
Mao said: ‘Great disorder across the land 
leads to great order. And so once again every 
seven or eight years’ . Today's Chinese 
leaders approvingly quote the first sentence 
and conveniently omit the second.
What does all this mean in more concrete 
terms?. Probably the central issue in poor 
post-revolutionary states is the relationship 
between econom ic growth and class 
inequality. The over-riding concern o f Mao’s 
thought, particularly since the First Five 
Year Plan period, (8) has been with the 
method by which these objectives could be 
pursued simultaneously without one being 
unduly sacrificed in the long term to the 
other - neither pure ‘economism’ nor pure 
class struggle. To people familiar with 
Russian debates in the 1920s, Mao’s ideas are 
not so original as some have claimed, but 
Mao, o f course, has attempted to pursue his 
objectives from a position of real power and 
with a mass of supporters. To either side of 
Mao in the Party there were groups whose 
estimates o f the relative importance of these 
goals differed from his. It is quite clear that it 
is the conservative group that has 
triumphed, that is to say, the group which 
attaches more weight to modernisation than 
to class struggle, more weight to developing 
the productive forces than to attacking 
inequality in production relations and in the 
superstructure. This can be seen from Hua 
Kuo-feng’s report to the 11th Party Congress 
which attacks the Gang for ‘dishing up an 
absurd theory about “the new changes in 
class relations in the socialist period”  ’ . He 
says that ‘it is necessary to carry on the 
revolution in the realm of the relations of 
production and to consolidate and develop 
socialist public ownership and other aspects 
of the socialist relations of production, so 
that they will correspond better with the 
expanding productive forces’. (My italics). 
Hua claims that ‘the productive forces are 
the most revolutionary factor’ .
The contrast with the Gang and their 
supporters is clear. For them ‘The historical 
task of the dictatorship o f the proletariat is 
the “ abolition o f all classes” ‘it must
not only transform the forms o f ownership 
but also transform all unequal relations as 
regards people’s position and mutual 
relations in the course of production as well 
as all unequal relations with respect to 
distribution .... in addition there are the 
relations in the political, ideological and 
cultural fields’. (9) They have been ridiculed 
by the conservatives for holding this view: 
they (the Gang) ‘even alleged that socialist 
revolution and class struggle were the 
ultimate goal of communists .... ’ but ‘to 
communists, socialist revolution and class 
struggle are means and not objectives’ . (10) 
Current articles from China in fact come 
close to suggesting that the objective of 
socialism is economic growth: ‘the triumph 
of socialism over capitalism .... means in the 
last analysis, abolishing the capitalist 
system o f  exploitation and all other 
exploiting systems so as to create labor 
productivity much higher than that under 
capitalism and turn out far more social 
products than those under capitalism to 
satisfy the needs of society’. (11)
CLASS INEQUALITY
We can conjecture then that China in the 
coming years will be characterised by the 
emergence of greater social inequality than 
has been permitted since the Cultural 
Revolution. This is not, o f course, at all 
incompatible with the reduction of controls 
over ‘freedom’ in culture, education, and 
scientific research. Rather than investigate 
the changes that have occurred and are 
likely to occur in every sphere o f class 
relations, I shall simply select two of the 
most important areas and analyse some of 
the alterations that have occurred there: 
firstly, urban enterprises, and secondly, the 
countryside.
One can encapsulate the difference 
between the thinking o f the two groups - the 
Gang and the present Chinese leaders - 
regarding these issues in respect to their 
approach to the important question of 
‘bourgeois rights’ . Following Marx’s famous 
discussion in his Critique o f  the G otha 
Program m e, all parties in the Chinese 
leadership have accepted that, given the 
general state o f social consciousness and the 
conditions o f material scarcity, it is 
necessary in the transitional period between 
capitalism and full communism to permit the
CHINA AFTER MAO 33
operation o f ‘bourgeois right’ - notably ‘equal 
pay for equal work’, but also such rights as 
equality of educational opportunity. 
Following Marx, the Gang and their 
supporters have stressed that society, even in 
the transitional phase, is structured in such a 
way as to permit different strata to benefit 
unequally from this ‘equal’ right: in Marx’s 
famous example the right to equal pay for 
equal work turns into a right o f inequality, 
because people have an unequal capacity to 
work - some are stronger and more skilled 
than others • and because people have 
unequal needs for income - especially due to 
differences in family sizes. The difference 
between the Gang and their opponents lies in 
the strong attempts that the Gang wanted to 
make to restrict the effects on inequality of 
the operation o f bourgeois right, (12) as 
opposed to their opponents, the current 
leaders, who regarded the operation o f such 
rights as essential to economic progress, and 
attempts to restrict their im pact as 
‘idealistic’ and ‘metaphysical’ .
I shall now look in more detail at the 
changes in policy since Mao in respect to 
urban enterprises.
As far as control within enterprises is 
concerned, the em phasis in Chinese 
publications since last October has been on 
the need to maintain ‘strict labor discipline’ 
and to enforce tightly ‘rational rules and 
regulations’ . Instead o f em phasising 
collective responsibility, it is likely that there 
will be a return to a system of personal 
responsibility for production tasks, and that 
ultimate responsibility within each 
enterprise will rest with a single individual. 
This seems to be the thrust of Vice-Premier 
Yu Chiu-li’s recent statement: ‘Enterprises 
should strengthen centralised Party 
leadership and institute the system of 
division of labor and responsibility under the 
leadership o f  the Party committee. 
Responsibility for the daily work in 
production, construction, and management 
in an enterprise rests with the chairman of 
the revolutionary committee. We should 
oppose the phenomenon of no one accepting 
the responsibility and struggle against 
anarchism’. (13) This appears to signal the 
return to a system of stricter work norms 
decided from above and less participation by 
w orkers in d e c is io n s  a ffe c t in g  the 
organisation of the work process. That classs 
struggle w ithin enterprises w ill be
downplayed is clear: ‘We must thoroughly 
criticise the “gang of four’s” .... attempt to 
cover up and replace the principal 
contradiction - between the proletariat and 
the bourgeoisie and between socialism and 
capitalism - with the so-called contradiction 
between higher and lower ranks, between the 
new and veteran cadres and between one 
section of the people and another’. (14) 
Concrete struggles over stratification are 
being replaced by metaphysical ones. The 
status and authority of managerial and 
technical staff are being restored in a firm 
manner after eleven years during which, in 
varying degrees, that status and authority 
has been questioned.
Are there likely to be any major changes in 
modes of remuneration and in degrees o f 
income inequality within urban enterprises? 
The Gang and their supporters have never 
denied the need for pay incentives at the 
present stage of China’s development, but 
they have consistently pushed for a 
reduction of the degree of inequality below 
that which was permitted during the First 
Five Year Plan (1953-57) and which re­
emerged in the early 1960s, as well as 
arguing for the removal of the most 
incentive-oriented forms o f remuneration 
such as individual bonuses and piece rates. 
Their views have had a substantial impact. 
Carl Riskin in his report to the US Congress 
Joint Economic Committee summarised the 
situation in the 1970s in the following way: 
’In sum it would seem that the scope o f the 
operation of material incentive devices as 
differential bonuses, piece rate mechanisms, 
and m ateria l aw ards to em u lation  
campaigners, have been ruled out since the 
Cultural Revolution. Significant wage and 
salary differences continue to exist. But they 
are gradually being narrowed, and their 
incentive effect on worker performance 
seems quite constrained even at present’. (15)
The signs all indicate that the trends from 
now on will be back towards greater 
inequalities, though specific details have not 
yet been spelled out. Hua Kuo-feng in his 
report to the 11th Party Congress accused the 
Gang of ‘absurdly taking higher rank and 
higher wages as the economic criteria .... for 
defining a “capitalist-roader” and of 
‘deliberately confounding the differences in 
distribution between the leading cadres o f 
the party, the government and the army on 
the one hand, and the broad masses on the
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other, with class exploitation’. If
‘differences in distribution’ are considered to 
have nothing to do with class, by the present 
leaders of China, then it is unlikely that the 
widening o f those differences would cause 
them difficulties on ideological grounds.
I shall now turn to the question o f likely 
trends in the countryside.
A major concern of the Gang and their 
supporters was with the problem posed by 
the peasantry in the transitional period. One 
cannot sufficiently em phasise how 
important an issue this is in China - a 
country that is certain to be numerically 
dominated by the peasantry for a long time 
to come. It is worth noting in passing just 
how inadequate has been the perspective of 
the ultra-leftist groups in the West on this 
issue, content to pillory Mao for his concern 
with the peasant question and quite 
confusingly dismissing him as either a 
'peasant populist’ concerned to turn China
into a land o f utopian rural communes, or as 
a ‘degenerate Stalinist’ concerned only to 
extract as much surplus value as possible 
from the peasantry.
In a realistic assessment of the nature of 
p easan t co n sc io u sn e ss  and o f  the 
importance o f agricultural production in the 
Chinese economy, the CCPhas had to permit 
the peasants to retain private plots of land, 
and private ownership of most of China’s 
pigs and much of its poultry; in the relations 
between town and countryside, commodity 
exchange still exists, albeit under state 
control, and in the countryside rural free 
markets are still quite widespread, though 
their share of total retail sales is small. In the 
countryside, as in the towns, it is accepted 
that the m ajor criterion o f income 
distribution is 'work' (depending on 
strength, skill and time worked), not ‘need’ . 
Moreover, instead o f state ownership 
com bined with a wage system, most 
agricultural means o f production are owned,
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and most agricultural income generated and 
distributed, at the level o f the production 
team, which is the smallest subdivision 
within the people’s commune, comprising an 
average o f only 30-40 households. Left 
unhindered, and especially with increasing 
supplies o f modem agricultural inputs 
becoming available, the potentialities for 
material differentiation to develop within 
this system are great, while the effects on 
peasant consciousness would also be 
regressive, in the sense of focusing attention 
on production within the household and the 
small collective unit, and how to gain the 
maximum economic advantages for those 
units.
The problems these posed for the 
transition from capitalism to communism 
were ones that greatly exercised the Gang 
and their supporters, as they did Mao 
himself. As in the urban sector, the Gang 
were concerned with ways o f trying to 
restrict the emergence of inequalities 
resulting from the operation of ‘bourgeois 
right’ , though they had to acknowledge that 
such ‘rights’ were essential to economic 
growth at the present stage. Combatting 
these tendencies requires action on two 
fronts: firstly, education in ‘socialist values’ 
such as trying to gradually reduce the area 
sown to private plots, to divert private 
production from sale on the free market to 
sale to the state, to persuade collectives to 
raise the proportion o f income distributed 
according to ‘need’ relative to ‘work’, and so 
on; secondly, action on the material front, by, 
for example, trying to divert a portion of 
supplies of modem inputs to poor areas and 
by arranging for the transfer of skilled state 
technicians to those areas. All of this, of 
course, really does require leadership from a 
strong communist party. The present group 
in power in China has tried to cloud the issue 
by accusing the Gang in many cases of 
supporting policies the exact opposite of 
those they in fact did advocate. However, 
through that fog of verbiage it is possible to 
perceive that the present group in power are 
indeed less concerned than the Gang about 
restricting the emergence of inequality in the 
countryside and more concerned with 
material advances.
A good example o f the contrasting 
approaches o f the Gang and the current 
leaders is the argument that raged at the top 
level o f the Party throughout 1976 over Hua
Kuo-feng’s important speech on agriculture 
in October 1975. (16) The main emphasis in 
his speech was on ways in which to speed up 
the mechanisation of Chinese agriculture ‘so 
as to ensure that the great task o f  
m e c h a n is in g  a g r ic u lt u r e  w i l l  be 
accomplished in the main by 1980’. The 
Gang apparently ‘slandered the report as a 
“ revision of Marxism-Leninism” and as 
“ advocating the theory of productive forces ”J
(i.e. placing the pursuit of economic growth 
above class struggle). The objections o f the 
Gang do appear valid. Not only is its main 
emphasis on modernisation rather than on 
problems o f inequality, but his discussion of 
p rod u ction  re la tion s  assu m es th at 
agriculture will move along in a socialist 
direction as a natural consequence o f 
m od ern isa tion . M e ch a n isa tio n  o f  
agriculture, says Hua, will lead to an 
expansion of income generation at levels 
above the production team, thereby 
permitting ‘a step-by-step transition to the 
system o f ownership that takes the 
production brigade or even the commune as 
the basic accounting unit’ . The Gang argued 
that Hua was over-optimistic about the likely 
speed o f expansion of mechanisation in 
agriculture, and that if the Party simply sits 
around and waits for production relations to 
be revolutionised by mechanisation, it will 
leave the way open for the emergence of 
greater differentiation and permit the 
c o n g e a l in g  o f  ‘ p e tty  p r o d u c t io n  
consciousness’. Thus, Chang Chun-chiao 
had earlier in 1975 pointed out that even in 
the most advanced communes on the 
outskirts o f Shanghai, the production teams 
still owned over one-half o f the total fixed 
assets in the communes. ‘Therefore, even if 
we take econom ic conditions in the 
communes alone, it will require a fairly long 
time to effect the transition from the team as 
the basic accounting unit to the brigade and 
then to the commune, Moreover, even when 
the commune becomes the basic accounting 
unit, the ownership will still be collective’. 
(17)
The argument is in outward appearance an 
exceedingly complex one, though beneath 
the surface some clear differences of 
principle can be observed. As for the future, it 
seems most unlikely that the present leaders 
will permit agriculture to regress to the 
degree tfiat was tolerated in the early 1960s, 
when the collective economy disintegrated in 
many places and differentiation proceeded
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apace. Rather, it seems likely thaT they will 
persist in modernising through the present 
structure, but show less concern than the 
Gang about reducing the resulting 
inequalities and attempting to educate the 
peasant consciousness out o f the patterns 
produced by these structures. The argument 
that modernisation will inevitably produce 
socialist consciousness is patently false, and 
the Gang’s arguments about the need to 
com bat em erging differentiation are 
currently being given little concrete 
attention.
ECONOMIC GROWTH
‘We must race against time, quicken our 
pace, greatly speed up the tempo of our 
industrial development, boost the national 
economy and build our socialist state o f the 
proletarian dictatorship into a more 
powerful country ....; we will surely realise 
the grand goal put forward by Chairman 
Mao o f surpassing the United States 
economically in several decades’. (18)
The Chinese media has been full of clarion 
calls of this kind in recent months, leaving 
the masses in no doubts as to the main 
priorities o f the leadership. Is it likely that 
China will advance as they hope, and will 
there be any fundamental alterations of 
economic policy in order to facilitate this?
Many observers in the West feel that the 
purge o f the Gang, due to the resulting 
changes in international economic policy, 
and because o f the reduced emphasis 
domestically on class struggle, will result in 
a significant increase in China’s growth 
rate. In the short-run this will certainly be 
true. 1976 was the worst year that the 
Chinese economy has experienced since the 
Cultural Revolution, and this was in no 
small measure due to widespread factional 
fighting and to resulting uncertainties. The 
victory o f the conservative group at the top 
will much reduce such disturbances and 
a cco rd in g ly  im p rov e  the e con om ic  
performance. More important, however, are 
the medium and long-term prospects. It is 
important to note here that the Gang was far 
from being in overall control of policy 
formulation: they have been balanced by 
more conservative figures, most notably 
Chou En-lai and recently Teng Hsiao-ping, 
since they rose to power during the Cultural 
Revolution. Moreover, their policies are by no
means as lacking in a pragmatic concern for 
economic growth as is currently being 
suggested. Further, ‘growth’ and ‘equality’ 
are by no means as irreconcilable as is 
sometimes argues.
Since the height o f the Cultural Revolution 
in 1966-68, when the extremes of radicalism 
did produce an adverse short-run impact on 
China’s economic growth, China’s growth 
record has in fact been most successful. In 
agriculture, faced with enormous difficulties, 
such as a static arable area and yields that 
were already high, output has been growing 
at just under 2 per cent per annum. (19) 
Industrial production since 1970 has been 
growing at just over 8 per cent per annum. 
(20) Most importantly, these figures have to 
be set against a rate of population growth 
that is probably already below 2 per cent and 
that has begun to fall significantly in the 
1970s, (21) due to China’s successful 
p rod u ction  and p o p u la r isa t io n  o f 
contraceptives, and to a successfulcampaign 
to persuade young people to delay the age at 
which they marry. China may well succeed 
in pushing up the per capita growth rate of 
national product, and over the long-run the 
absence o f ‘Cultural Revolutions’ should 
enable a steadier rate to be maintained, but it 
seem s u n lik e ly  that C h in a ’ s good  
performance since the Cultural Revolution in 
terms of aggregate growth rates will be 
dramatically improved upon.
I shall now turn to look at some of the 
major areas of interest as far as growth is 
concerned.
At the centre of the growth process stands 
investment ■ the necessary (though not 
sufficient) condition par excellence. There 
seems to be little likelihood that the new 
leadership will be able to raise the rate of 
investment, since it already stands at a high 
level. (22) In fact, it seems more likely that 
the opposite will occur, since there are strong 
hints that there will be a significant rise in 
real living standards. This would be 
especially important as far as the urban 
workers are concerned, since their real wages 
have increased very little since the late 
1950s. Moreover, it is easier to increase living 
standards in the towns than the countryside 
due to the much smaller number of workers 
involved. To do this, however, would reverse 
the trend of the past decade or so, of 
narrowing urban-rural real income
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d i f f e r e n t ia l s .  C e r ta in  im p o r ta n t  
contradictions for the new regime are thus 
emerging. Already there are clear signs that 
its appeal is principally an ‘economistic’ one 
of being able to provide higher living 
standards, which is most important in a 
country as poor as China still is. If the 
increase in real income is a significant one 
applying to all sectors, then a big dent will be 
made in funds available for investment, and 
it would require a large compensating 
increase in output resulting from the positive 
effect on motivation if the leeway was to be 
made up. On the other hand, increasing 
urban incomes more than those in the 
countryside could threaten the regime’s 
stability through incurring peasant 
opposition.
In respect to investment allocations, three 
major features have been outstanding since 
the Cultural Revolution and it is important to 
inquire if these will change. Firstly, there is 
the continued emphasis of heavy industry 
over light industry: producer goods output is 
estimated to have grown at 15 per cent per 
annum between 1967 and 1974, relative to 8 
per cent for industrial consumer goods. (23) 
Given the above surmises about increases in 
comsumption levels, it is likely that some re­
orientation of the respective growth rates of 
the two sectors will follow. A second issue 
here is that of scale. One of the distinctive 
features of Maoist economics has been that 
of ‘walking on two legs’ - enlarging the small 
and the large-scale industrial sectors 
simultaneously. However, while the small- 
scale sector is extremely important in the 
production o f certain items (notably 
agricultural inputs) it is still dwarfed by the 
large-scale sector in its contribution to total 
industrial output. (24) There is no indication 
that the new leaders intend to alter the 
balance evolved in the 1970s. A third 
important area concerning allocation of 
investment is that of the stress given within 
the heavy industrial Bector to different 
branches. Since the early 1960s the Chinese 
have strongly emphasised the growth of 
those branches producing for agriculture: 
chemical fertiliser production, for example, 
rose at 17 per cent per annum between 1967 
and 1974. (25) Again, there is no indication 
that this balance will be altered.
A most important issue is that o f technical 
progress, which greatly influences the 
effectiveness o f  new investm ent and
consequently plays a central role in 
economic growth. Two of the vital areas here 
are those o f indigenous scientific and 
technical advance, and the role of foreign 
trade.
Some areas o f Chinese research, such as 
nuclear weaponry, have gone through the 
period since the Cultural Revolution 
untouched. However, the attempts o f the 
Gang to restrict the impact of the operation 
of ‘bourgeois right’ in the education and 
research fields seem to have had a 
detrimental effect on the rate o f scientific 
advance in a wide range o f areas. The Gang 
has attempted to integrate scientific and 
technical personnel into ordinary production 
work so as to prevent the emergence of an 
isolated laboratory - and university-bound 
group. Such integration has had positive 
pay-offs for production in transferring 
theoretical knowledge into practical use and 
in guiding research into useful channels, but 
it seems to have been difficult to steer a 
middle course without antagonising 
scientific workers: ‘They (the Gang) alBo 
equated intellectuals with the bourgeoisie, 
saying that “ intellectuals with technical 
knowledge are the most dangerous” . This 
seriously dampened the enthusiasm of 
scientists and technicians’. (26) Moreover, 
the Gang are said to have reduced the 
resources devoted to scientific research they 
‘arbitrarily dissolved a number o f scientific 
research institutes, slashed important 
scientific research items and barred many 
scientists from doing research work’. (27) 
The Chinese admit that their‘work in 
science and technology falls far short o f the 
needs o f industrial and agricultural 
production and national defence’, (28) and 
the net effect o f the policies adopted in this 
field since the Cultural Revolution has 
probably been to reduce the rate o f technical 
progress substantially below the maximum 
obtainable. There is little doubt that more 
resources will be devoted to these areas, that 
the prestige and probably also the relative 
income o f scientific workers will increase, 
that less o f their time will be spent at 
physical labor, and that technological 
progress will be assisted by a generally more 
efficiency-oriented educational system.
Much-of the attention o f the media in the 
West over the year preceding Mao’s death 
focused on the struggle over international 
eocnomic relations, and in particular over
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the degree to which China should permit 
h e rs e lf  to becom e in te rn a tio n a lly  
‘dependent’. ‘Dependence’ can be viewed 
from a variety o f angles. There seems no 
doubt that the Gang were strongly opposed 
to financial ‘dependence’ in the shape of 
substantial debt obligations, such as began 
to accumulate in the mid-1970s to finance 
China’s extensive program of complete plant 
imports. It is likely that the new regime will 
be more prepared to extend C hina ’s 
indebtedness to obtain the imports they 
want. (29) Another aspect o f ‘dependence’ is 
the technological one. It is quite clear that 
the current leaders are keener to import 
foreign technology than the Gang were, and 
not simply because they are prepared to 
pursue a less conservative policy on 
international payments. It does seem as 
though the Gang made an incorrect 
judgment about this issue, by tending to view 
technological independence as the ability to 
make most technological innovations 
domestically as opposed to viewing it as the 
ability to independently select, adapt, and 
dissem inate new technology in use 
elsewhere. In this context, it is worth bearing 
in mind that ‘in the 1950s, a period when 
American technological leadership was at its 
peak, more than half the new knowledge that 
affected economic growth in the United 
States was o f foreign origin. If this was the 
case in the leading country, then the 
likelihood for genuine technological self­
reliance and independence .... in follower 
countries such as China must seem remote 
indeed’. (30) The Gang did not deny entirely 
the need for foreign technology, but they may 
have underestimated its importance, and 
overestimated the degree to which 
technological independence is possible. A  
paradox o f their position is that to the degree 
that their policies adversely affected the pace 
o f China’s scientific advance, they hindered 
her a b ility  to d ev e lop  a b a s is  for  
independently  selecting, adapting and 
disseminating foreign technology, and 
producing dom estically  useful economic 
products based on that technology.
CONCLUSION
At the most general level then, it seems 
likely that the ‘new’ regime in China will 
be characterised by the following features: 
continued tight Party control o f organised 
s o c ia l  l i f e ,  p r o b a b ly  w ith  som e
strengthening o f inner-Party control; a 
continuance o f a relatively small degree of 
influence by the mass of the population over 
the State apparatus above the level of the 
immediate production unit; a move towards 
greater inequality in income and control 
within productive enterprises; greater 
freedom in the production of, and greater 
inequality in access to, cultural products; 
some immediate increase in real living 
standards, probably more in the town than 
in the countryside; some increae in, and 
greater long-run stability of, the rate o f per 
capita economic growth; a more extensive 
purchase of foreign technology, and an 
increase in international indebtedness.
The character .of China’s social relations 
seems likely to return to something closer to 
the First Five Year Plan period, though it is 
unlikely that t here will be a ‘retreat’ o f the 
kind that characterised the early 1960s, 
when China was in such dire economic 
straits. Where does that leave us in our 
estimate of China? I think it is most 
important to keep a sense of perspective 
about what is happening.
Despite the fact that China’s political 
economy will be of a more ‘economistic’ kind, 
it will still be radically different in its 
fundamentals from the developing capitalist 
regimes of Asia: there is no sign that 
econom ic planning will be any less 
comprehensive - the signs are that, if 
anything, the degree of central control will be 
tighter. That planning mechanism should 
permit China to attain a reasonably rapid 
rate of growth and to insulate herself more 
than the capitalist regimes from fluctuations 
on world markets. There is no evidence that 
the Chinese will abandon their commitment 
to full employment - a commitment that in 
China has been made a reality by the 
operation o f a predominantly state and 
collective ownership system in relation to the 
means of production, in stark contrast to the 
abysmal failure of capitalism in this 
direction elsewhere in Asia. There is no sign 
that China will cease to guarantee a basic 
minimum living standard to all its people, as 
opposed to the appalling poverty that still 
exists for the lowest strata in the capitalist 
As ian countries. Despite the likely widening 
of income inequalities, it is probable that the 
differentials in China will still be smaller 
than throughout capitalist Asia. In short, the 
Chinese path to industrialisation will
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continue to be superior to the capitalist path 
in its fundamental respects.
There are, then, strict parameters within 
which most of the leading party members in 
China since Liberation have operated: a 
commitment to tight Party control and 
strong inner-Party discipline, conservatism 
about the need for a ‘professional’ state 
apparatus, commitment to a planned 
economy guaranteeing full employment and 
basic minimum living standards to all its 
people, and so on. However, I think that the 
struggles of the past two years show quite 
clearly that behind the froth of political 
debate and personality struggle, there have 
been important areas o f disagreement - 
indeed, two opposing ‘lines’ on the political 
economy of development. (31) There is a 
strong school of thought among Western 
leftists that is not only reluctant to 
acknowledge the positive advantages for 
reasonably humane industrialisation of the 
Chinese approach, but which also is inclined 
to interpret the great swings in policy that
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FRANCE GOES TO THE 
P O LLS . 77ii's article was written by  an Australian leftist u>ho has been living in Paris for  several years.
I
The present political situation in France 
could hardly be described as simple. A few 
months ago, however, it looked fairly cut and 
dried - at least up to a certain point. The 
Union of the Left looked certain to win the 
elections in March 1978. The left had just 
won the local elections throughout France 
with two-thirds ofthe municipalities electing 
communist or socialist mayors. Paris itself, 
despite the fact that its working class base
had been eroded by the pressure of hign rents 
and “development” projects, just failed to 
have a communist by 2,700 votes. Then there 
was May 24, the day o f the national strike. 
The demonstration in Paris was over 16 
kilometres long - the atmosphere was festive; 
the smell of victory was in the air for the first 
time since May ’68.
Victor^in the elections seemed certain and 
so the discussion centred on the possible 
scenarios after the elections. One scenario 
was that the implementation o f the Common
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Program would “ get the country out o f the 
crisis” and then provide the bridge towards 
the construction o f “socialism in the colors of 
France” . This was the official position o f the 
Communist Party and included the 
acceptance of the possibility that the right 
could possibly return to power in future 
elections.
A second, more utopian, scenario was that 
the victory of the left in the elections would 
mark a “ point o f no return”  where the 
Common Program would be just a starting 
point and that a socialist-com m unist 
government would have to rely increasingly 
upon a popular mass movement to combat 
the attacks and economic sabotage of 
national and international capitalist 
interests. The Common Program would be 
inadequate to satisfy the demands and rising 
hopes of the masses of people who voted for it 
and France would quickly fall into a 
revolutionary situation.
Then there was the “ eurocommunist” 
perspective. A rupture with capitalism in 
France would coincide with similar 
movements in Italy and, hopefully, Spain, 
Portugal and even possibly Belgium, leading 
to the establishment of a southern European 
bloc, differing radically in its democratic 
form from all previous communist societies.
Such a bloc would be economically, 
socially and politically viable, would alter all 
existing alliances in the third world and 
would set a model for workers in other 
capitalist countries where the political 
struggle was less developed.
One way or the other, the future, although 
uncertain, was full o f hope. One certainly 
had the feeling o f at least being on the 
winning side.
Shortly after the May national strike the 
situation started to look a little more 
complicated. The Common Program of the 
three left parties (the Communist Party, the 
Socialist Party and the Left Radicals) which 
had been signed in 1972, a period o f relative 
prosperity, had to be renegotiated to bring it 
up to date. In addition, the Communist Party 
was demanding that many of the vague 
proposals should be made more concrete “ for 
a good actualisation of the program, 
concretely defined, so that workers know 
exactly what they are fighting for and won’t 
be deceived after the elections” .
The heart o f the debate quickly centred on 
the following major issues:
* The nationalisations —
The socialists and particularly the left 
radicals opted for a conservative reading 
o f  t h e  C o m m o n  P r o g r a m .  
Nationalisations would be kept to a 
minimum with only the mother holding 
company nationalised and not the 
affiliates. The companies would be run 
by delegates appointed by the left 
government.
T he com m u n ists  cou n terp osed  
a d d it io n a l n a t io n a lis a t io n s  o f 
companies such as Citroen, and steel, 
due to the crisis now present in these 
industries. The nationalisations should 
be total and not “ just the brass plate on 
the door” , but all affiliated companies. 
The control of the companies would be a 
form of workers’ control.
* T he minimum w age
The basic wage in the 1972 common 
program was to be set at 1,000 francs 
($200) a month - a ridiculous figure in 
1977 with over 100 per cent inflation 
since then. The CPF proposed 2,400 
francs while the socialists proposed 
2,200 francs “ negotiable with the unions 
after the elections".
* The w age scale
The Communist Party proposed a 
maximum ratio o f salaries allowable in 
the country to be 5 to 1. The socialists 
and left radicals were against such a 
scheme, but would probably accept a 
ratio of 10 to 1.
* N ational defence
Major differences on defence policy, 
particularly as regards NATO. The 
situation was a little complicated also by 
a major about-face of the CP in going for 
a nuclear arms policy {a shock which is 
still reverberating in the ranks of the 
party).
The Communist Party attacked the 
socialists, the previous “champions of 
workers’ control” for their watered-down 
“ participation” scheme. The socialists 
retorted that the “ workers’ control” of the 
communists was only “union control” under 
the bureaucracy o f the CGT union.
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The negotiations dragged on with certain 
concessions being made on both sides. The 
question of the nationalisations, however, 
became more and more hotly debated with 
the two sides taking up intransigent 
positions.
Then Fabre, the leader o f the Left Radicals 
in a typical radical party ploy, slammed the 
door o f the negotiations, saying that the 
nationalisations of the communists were 
completely unacceptable.
Negotiations recommenced shortly after 
with the three parties very close to a 
com prom ise. The socialists proposed 
nationalising 270 o f the affiliates against the 
700-odd o f the communists. The other 
questions were considered to be either 
resolved or “negotiable” . The negotiations 
broke up at that point with neither side 
willing to concede another inch.
In the months that have followed the 
situation has gone from bad to worse. To the 
Communist Party, the Socialist Party has 
made a “ turn to the right" and wants to 
“manage the capitalist crisis”  andinstitutea 
plan of austerity after the style of the social 
democratic parties in Britain and Germany.
To the socialists, the Communist Party has 
returned to its old stalinist politics, doesn’t 
want to take power and can’t tolerate the 
notion of a strong socialist party.
A  fee lin g  o f  d esp a ir , g loom  and 
hopelessness swept in to replace the heady 
heights of the municipal elections and the 
great May national strike.
II
After the municipal elections of March ’77, 
with 70 per cent of the large cities in France 
electing socialist or communist mayors, one 
o f the left dailies ran a headline France is 
P in k !”  Capitalist France had voted 
massively for the Union of the Left with 
many cities that before had never even had a 
socialist mayor electing communists. In 
many towns and cities, people were dancing 
in the streets. It was even reported in one 
town that the village priest joined in with the 
crowd to sing the Internationale!
A study o f the voting figures showed two 
very important and interesting phenomena. 
The first was that the Union o f the Left had
worked as it had never done before. In the 
French two-round voting system, a 
candidate wins if he/Bhe gets over 50 per cent 
in the first round. If no one gets an absolute 
majority the vote is decided by a “ first past 
the post” system in a second round which 
follows one week later. The electoral alliance 
o f the Union o f the Left is an agreement by 
which the left candidate who gets the most 
votes in the first round stands alone against 
the right in the second round.
The problem in the past has been that 
although the well disciplined communist 
voters would vote for a socialist in the second 
round it was much more difficult to get 
socialists to vote communist. The important 
point of the municipal elections is that the 
socialists did vote communist in the second 
round. As l ’ Humanite, the CPF daily put it: 
“The elections marked the end o f anti­
communism in France” ,
The second point was the incredibly high 
vote for the environmentalists and the 
extreme left in the first round. In many o f the 
large cities they each received about 10 per 
cent of the vote. Practically all these votes 
then went to the Union o f the Left in the 
second round. The environmental movement 
was previously very weak in France. It’s 
startling electoral success marked its birth 
as a new and important political force in 
French politics - a point which didn’t escape 
the French bourgeoisie. A  few months later 
the ecologists organised the huge anti- 
nuclear demonstration at Malville where 
they had their first death as a result of a 
police offensive grenade - a deliberate 
attempt by the government to brand the 
environment movement as “ terrorist” , 
hoping to tarnish its wide electoral appeal.
The extreme left vote was a much more 
complex phenomenon, indicating a certain 
dissatisfaction o f traditional working class 
voters with the ambiguities of the Union of 
the Left (17 per cent o f one working class 
quarter in Orleans voted for the extreme left 
candidate) rather than a rapport with the 
philosophy of the extreme left coalition made 
up o f three of the largest extreme left parties.
Paradoxically, after receiving its greatest 
electoral support ever, the extreme left then 
went into a state of crisis with the daily 
R ouge almost going bankrupt for want of 
support and having to launch itself into a 
long process of self-criticism. Many people
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were leaving the extreme left parties and, in 
general, questioning the elitist attitudes of 
the movement and its leadership, its 
continual interventions “ from outside” , the 
idea of the “ professional Leninist-type 
revolutionary”  and the blind militancy 
demanded o f its members. In addition, the 
extreme left was finding it increasingly 
difficult to distinguish themselves from the 
Communist Party.
Semi-crisis in the extreme left was followed 
by a real crisis in the Union o f the Left. The 
starting point can be traced to the TV debate 
between Mitterand, the Socialist Party 
leader and Prime Minister Barre. Just before 
the debate, the Communist Party had 
released its version o f the Common Program 
complete with costs and figures, which went 
rather further than the socialist version. In 
front o f one o f the largest TV audiences in 
French history, Mitterand flatly stated that 
the program and figures were unacceptable 
to the Socialist Party. People watched 
dumbfounded as he then engaged in a 
friendly dialogue with his apparent 
colleague and supposed arch enemy, 
Raymond Barre.
From that day onwards the debate over the 
concrete development of the Common 
Program continued, the Socialist Party and 
Mitterand strategically being forced into, or 
willingly taking, a conservative position. 
The debate was carried out at the top level of 
the party hierarchies with absolutely no 
participation of rank and file members. It 
was a mass media event with the passive 
audience, the French people, watching 
hopelessly as the “ stars” , Mitterand, 
Marchais and Fabre, tore up the last 
remaining shreds o f the Union o f the Left.
It was now the turn of the traditional left to 
engage in a process of criticism and 
recrimination.
To the Communist Party, the socialists 
had taken a “turn to the right” but it was 
having considerable difficulty convincing its 
members of this. The debate over the 
“ actualisation of the common program" in 
1977 was not that much different from the 
heated debates that preceded the signing of 
the program five years earlier. Every 
communist knows that the socialists can’t be 
trusted but that is nothing new - they knew 
that when they signed the Common Program 
in 1972.
To many people, both inside and outside 
the party, the major disagreement seemed to 
be the nationalisation of 270 company 
affiliates as proposed by the Socialist Party 
against the 700 of the Communist Party. It 
seemed that the difference was hardly going 
to affect things one way or the other and was 
hardly worth threatening the prospects of 
the left in general and the aspirations of the 
millions of people who supported it.
Another point brought up in the debate 
that was now raging in full force in the press, 
the cafes and party cellules, was the political 
turn of the Communist Party. At the 22nd 
Congress two years ago, the party 
abandoned the notion - or at least the 
wording - of “ the dictatorship o f the 
proletariat” and in so doing also effectively 
accepted that the Communist Party was not 
the only legitimate party of the left. The 
present position of the CP is an apparent 
about-face with the party now claiming to be 
the on ly  party o f the left with the Socialist 
Party being hopelessly reformist and social 
democrat. Such a rapid and fundamental 
c h a n g e  h a s  c a u s e d  c o n s i d e r a b l e  
apprehension among traditional supporters 
of the party.
Another point o f concern to Communist 
Party supporters is the leadership’s attack 
on the Socialist Party as a homogeneous unit 
when, in fact, it is a coalition of many 
con flicting  tendencies including, for 
example, the CERES. The CERES is a sort of 
“socialist left” in the SP and represents 25 
per cent of the membership. On many issues 
it is to the left of the CP and, due to its 
considerable intellectual prowess, has 
played an important role in the theoretical 
evolution of the Communist Party on such 
matters as workers’ control, etc. By ignoring 
the diversity o f the Socialist Party, the CP 
l e a d e r s h i p  m a y  be u n w i t t i n g l y  
strengthening the hand of Mitterand at the 
expense of the more left forces in the party.
The debate and the political evolution 
continues and is not as destructive as it 
might first appear.
Ill
Paris has always been regarded as one of 
the most beautiful cities in the world with its 
wide avenues, its famous cafes and that
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bewildering array of whites and greys 
reflected from its majestic buildings. Its 
image in places like Australia is of “ gay 
Paree” , accompanied by Paris fashions, 
visions of the Eiffel tower, Notre Dame, and 
the Follies Bergere.
But behind this facade is another Paris - a 
Paris which is dying. It is being choked to 
death by a tight 40 kilometre circular 
“ freeway”  which spreads out in a wide band 
of misery for the people who live anywhere 
near it. Cutting through parks and 
previously tranquil residential areas, it is 
already saturated with a continuously 
snarling, rumbling, multi-lane traffic jam. 
The automobile has invaded Paris to such a 
degree that the benefits of owning a car are at 
best dubious. The environmental impact has 
been disastrous. The noise and pollution are 
often unbearable.
The automobile is only part o f the 
destruction o f Paris; a destruction that is 
proceeding at such a rate that one can see it 
taking place every day. I live near the Place 
des Fetes, an old, previously working class 
area, where rents were cheap and life, 
although hard, was relatively gay with over 
50 inexpensive bistros in a small radius.
Now it is all gone. The developers have 
moved in, razing it to the ground. The elderly 
who have spent all their lives in the quarter, 
have been forced out into the suburbs 
together with those workers who couldn’t 
afford the new rents. The Place des Fetes is 
now dominated by massive high rise 
apartment and office buildings.
Life for a French worker is becoming 
increasingly difficult in Paris, as elsewhere 
in France, with cramped living conditions, 
increasingly longer distances to travel to 
work, spiralling prices and the ever-present 
threat of unemployment. For the hundreds of 
thousands of foreign workers, the situation is 
even more intolerable.
It would be simplistic to say that the 
present wide discontent is just due to 
economic causes. It goes deeper than that. 
Many contributing factors have led to the 
developm ent o f  a deep-rooted social 
movement towards the left.
The uprising of May ’68 marked its 
beginning, even though it terminated in an 
electoral return for the right - albeit with
many social and economic gains to the 
French working class. In the wake o f the 
traumatic events of ’68 the concept of the 
Union o f the Left w;as conceived by the CP, 
gained acceptance by the newly-formed 
Socialist Party, with the Common Program 
being signed in 1972. The third party in the 
union, the Left Radicals, joined a few months 
later. The two big unions, the CGT and the 
CFDT, tacitly approved the program.
At that time the economic outlook was 
entirely different from that o f today. The 
prospect was still one o f continuing 
expansion despite some o f the looming 
economic problems. The task o f the Union of 
the Left was to break the stranglehold of the 
multinationals and monopolies on the 
economy, bring about a major improvement 
in social and economic conditions for the less 
favored and start the construction of 
socialism based on a new form o f democracy - 
the worker-controlled socialism o f the 
Socialist Party and the CFDT or the more 
paternalist idea of the Communist Party and 
the CGT at that time - that o f democratic 
management.
The theoretical doctrine of the Communist 
Party which justified their political position 
was based upon an economic analysis of 
“ State Monopoly Capitalism” . According to 
this “ SMC” theory, the chronic problem of 
periodic crises o f overproduction in a 
capitalist regime had been solved by 
monopoly capitalist interests using the state 
apparatus to overcom e the inherent 
contradictions o f the system. The crisis of 
overproduction of the capitalist system, 
according to Marx, leads to an economic 
depression where capital is destroyed or 
devalorised. After this process has reached a 
certain level, the conditions become 
favorable for the beginning of a new wave of 
expansion, going on to a boom and of course 
another crisis. According to the SMC theory 
of the Communist Party, the capitalist state, 
dictated to by monopoly interests, had 
deve l oped  means  o f  c o n t i n u a l l y  
devalorising capital by, for example, the 
state becoming a consumer (building up the 
public sector, armaments, etc.), offering 
cheap credit facilities to the monopolies, and 
so on. In each case the surplus capital arising 
from overproduction for the available 
market, can be continuously “ destroyed” or
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“ devalorised” . In so doing, the state 
continuously guarantees profits to the 
m onopolies and hence overcom es the 
periodic crises and depressions o f capitalism.
The political conclusion of this analysis is 
that the objective enemy is the monopolies 
and that one must organise the great mass of 
the French people against two or three per 
cent o f the population (the big bourgeoisie 
and the monopolies). The object was that the 
left was to take over the state apparatus and 
turn it from being a reflection o f monopoly 
capitalist interests to being a reflection of the 
interests o f the working class and its allies.
From 1972 to 1977, the economic situation 
had changed drastically. It is here that some 
left writers place the fundamental cause for 
the break-up o f the Union o f the Left, the 
changed economic scenario posing severe 
problems for the Communist Party at three 
levels.
At the practical level, the Communist 
Party feared the unknown consequences of 
being involved in a minority position in a 
Socialist-Communist government during a 
period of economic crisis.
This fear becomes clearer at the theoretical 
level due to the Communist Party’s lack o f 
any deep understanding o f the overall world 
capitalist crisis. Its state monopoly capitalist 
theory served more as a justification o f the 
previous political strategy than a theory 
which fitted with reality.
The third level is that of the conception of 
socialism. The Communist Party lacks a 
clear viable model of what it means by 
socialism. The old model of the Soviet Union, 
after the 1968 events in France and, more 
importantly, in Czechoslovakia, is no longer 
credible for the industrialised societies and 
practically  nobody really doubts the 
existence of the Gulag reality. These events 
and their influence, particularly on the new 
wave o f young communist militants, have 
necessitated an evolution in the conceptions 
o f the party. This evolution, although 
positive and necessary, has not been one 
towards greater clarity but has unleashed 
certain contradictions and confusions in the 
ranks o f the party. The model of socialism 
varies from the old Soviet model with the 
rider that it must be more democratic, to 
rather vague notions of what will happen 
after the implementation o f the defunct
Common Program. The necessity to change 
and adopt a more democratic image has 
come into conflict with the centralised 
structure of the party. The evolution has 
taken place, however, at the cellular level 
where discussion is the most open it has ever 
been. The party is hence more democratic 
than it has ever been, but the contradiction is 
that it is at the same time more centralised 
and dictatorial than ever to counteract the 
first tendency. The new party line is now 
obtained by w atching M archais on 
television. What then follows is a free and 
open discussion on the wisdom o f the party 
adopting the new line!
The theoretical and conceptual crisis in the 
French Communist Party becomes more 
clear when one notes that it refused to 
participate in the December Colloquium on 
Eurocommunism in Lugano, while Italian 
and Spanish parties sent top members from 
their central committees. To participate in 
such a debate, the French CP would have run 
the risk of contradicting many of their 
present official explanations in France.
If the economic crisis has plunged the left 
into disarray, it has also had its effect on 
framing the basic social reality against 
which all o f the political and electoral 
aspects must be seen in proper perspective.
Despite the break-up o f the Union o f the 
Left, the government has not progressed one 
pointIA recent poll has shown that the 
“ intention to vote” for the left would give PC - 
21 per cent, PSU - two per cent, PS and Left 
Radicals - 27 per cent, environmentalists - 
three per cent.... a total of 53 per cent against 
47 per cent for the right. This is almost 
exactly the same as in June ’77 just before the 
crisis in the left broke out! The relative 
rapport between the PC and the PS, if 
anything, shows a slight gain for the PC.
What then is taking place in France is the 
evolution o f a deep, broadly based movement 
towards the left that goes beyond even the 
political parties. If the break-up of the Union 
o f the Left has brought dism ay and 
disillusion to France, it certainly has not 
changed the underlying social reality.
Despite all the contradictions and 
confusion, it is the French Communist Party 
that has the monopoly on the slogan o f the 
hour .... “ the French people want change .... 
they want a real change” .
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A nnie H all, with Woody Allen and Diane 
Keaton (Hoyts Entertainment Centre, 
S yd n ey ; V illa g e  C in em a , Toorak,  
Melbourne).
Woody Allen builds into Annie H all two 
counter-analytical devices designed to render his 
“sensitive” , “honest” , “moving” film critic proof.
First, he presents a film critic/academic as a 
posturing, petty, jargon-laden, insensitive bore - 
that’s one in the eye for all those second-raters who 
try to wring Meaning, Message, Massage, or Deep 
Kulchural Significance from this little opus. Your 
Friendly Neighborhood Critic, reeling from the 
onslaught, then must confront the second barrier 
to understanding this film: the explicit 
introductory statement by Allen (who portrays 
Alvie) that the film is in the nature of a search for 
the causes of the break-up of a relationship. The 
story is thus made particular, concerning Alvie (a 
twice-married, twice-divorced New York Jewish 
comedian, sufficiently well-known to perform at 
Democratic Party political rallies) and Annie (an 
insecure WASP from an uptight, mid-West family, 
trying to break into the New York nightclub scene 
as a singer), and the implication is that the 
trajectory of their relationship - how two people 
“made it” together and then, somehow, sadly, lost 
it - bears no social significance.
It is clear that this is poppycock - even the self- 
indulgent Allen cannot believe that people around 
the world will pay money for the sheer pleasure of 
watching Woody and Diane Keaton disport 
themselves, absent some larger context than that 
of biography.
But still, given the public exposure of the 
characters’ intimate fears, vulnerabilities, 
irrationalities and foibles - examination, you may 
argue, only undertaken by Bergman and long 
overdue in American cinema - how illegitimate it 
seems to apply the critic’s cold tools to all that 
revealed emotional flesh. Of course, one might 
carp; at the film’s male egocentrism; at the context, 
remorselessly crazy urban America (New York 
and Los Angeles), where neuroses, psychoses and 
a generalised autism seem to flower in desperate 
profusion; at the ending, despite the humor, so sad 
.... yep, Boy Eventually Loses Girl.
Against these quibbles is an array of what are 
widely regarded as Good Things: the honesty with 
which Alvie's and Annie’s sexual and emotional 
hang-ups are displayed; the bitter-sweet humor of 
Alvie’s capacity to encounter/handle/transcend 
emotional pain; the celebration of that sense of 
absurdity we all need to help us survive; and 
finally, the presentation of reality as relative.
Far and away the Best Thing, of course, is how 
true to life the picture of their relationship is ■ for
haven’t we all “found” someone at some time, felt 
wonderful, revived, alive - and then felt the fabric 
fray, tear, and finally, bewilderingly, fall apart in 
our hands. How could we fail to respond, then, to 
the film’s loving treatment of our own joys and 
resentment? How well we recognise ourselves in 
Annie Hall’s use of child-like fantasies, ratifying 
our own attempts to make the world behave as you 
would like it to, if only for a moment: Alvie, 
standing in a movie queue, annoyed beyond 
endurance by the aforementioned academic’s 
pseudo-isms about Marshall McLuhan, fetches the 
great man from behind a convenient billboard and 
blissfully hears McLuhan tell the prattler that he 
hasn’t a clue what he, McLuhan is on about.
Given all this, Annie H all seems a paragon of 
sensitivity and insight, giving us both an accurate 
picture of our own crazy, contradictory, and self- 
defeating emotions and a means of coming to 
terms with them, through a cautious, resilient 
zaniness. For Allen, this zaniness is grounded in 
the knowledge that the world is both doomed and 
absurd: We see the young Alvie refusing to do his 
homework; his science textbook has revealed that 
the universe is constantly expanding, thus 
constantly in danger of exploding, thus “what’s 
the point of doing homework?” It is also grounded 
in the recognition of an existential necessity that 
keeps human beings active in this absurd and 
antipathetic world.
Allen, through Alvie, is pretty murky about the 
nature of the need which keeps us drearily 
plugging along despite a plethora of setbacks (in 
the film, the protagonist is an emotional two-time 
loser). But two jokes provide an insight:
1st Man: What a misfortune. It’s Terrible. It’s 
crazy. My brother thinks he’s a chicken.
2nd Man: How awful! Why don’t you take him 
to a doctor?
1st Man (anguished): How can I? We need the 
eggs!
■
1st Woman (in a restaurant): My God, the food 
in this place is terrible!
2nd Woman: Absolutely revolting! And not 
only that, but the portions are so small!
There you have it, folks; driven by necessity (the 
ubiquitous “eggs”), we mustsurvive, somehow, the 
impossible struggle. Yet even while we writhe, 
pointlessly, in the toils, we feel how little time we 
have, how imminent is death.... and we resolve not 
to go gently into that good night, no matter what a 
relief it would be logically to have an end to our 
painful and hopeless contortions.
Now all of this is so much hooey, the product 
both o r  Allen ’s carefully unpretentious 
pretentiousness and of a broad-spectrum 
positivism which sees social reality as static,
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struggles as individual, ontological givens, and 
the present as all-engulfing. More importantly, it 
reflects the concerns of what Christopher Lasch 
has called the Narcissist Society!
Firstly, the film celebrates emotionalism, and in 
this sense is generally part of contemporary 
cinema’s interest in mass producing the 
extraordinary - no emotion/psychic state is too 
bizarre to be explored on the silver screen. The 
particular emotionalism portrayed here is that 
deriving from an awareness of self - self seen notin 
any historical or relational sense, but as the locus 
of “feelings” , the most important being the sense 
of personal well-being derived from a recognition 
and articulation of one’s individual needs and 
demands. Annie Hall lauds the characters’ 
“ knowledge” of themselves, a knowledge 
inherently flawed because it deals with how  they 
are what they are rather than why they are what 
they are. Thus, for them, it is important to gain 
access to their personal idiosyncrasies in demands 
and needs; once these are fully and frankly out in 
the open, with and without the assistance of 
therapists - one can then see how the sets of 
demands in any relationship (for sexual-ego- 
intellectual-political satisfaction) mesh. If they do, 
fine; if they don’t, well, too bad, on to the next 
relationship in the (probably vain) hope that we’ll 
be luckier next time.
In Annie H all there is virtually no notion of 
people mediating their demands. The “honest” 
thing for Annie and Alvie to do once they’ve 
discovered their incompatibilities, is regretfully 
draw a line under their relationship. In our 
recognition of their pain, their bewilderment, their 
reluctance to part, we run a serious risk of 
overlooking the significance of their “defeat” of 
the abandonment of a relationship that doesn’t 
quite “make it” . Such disposability illustrates a 
major capitulation to instrumental rationality of 
late capitalism, where people - like commodities - 
are viewed as collections of characteristics, and 
personal relationships as merely the mutual 
reinforcement of emotional demand curves.
Secondly, human needs - the “eggs” in the joke - 
are reified. Today’s needs - potent sexual 
responsiveness, instant emotional gratification, 
etc. - are seen as trans-historical and it becomes 
impossible to ask whether today’s needs were 
yesterday’s needs, why private, emotional 
security might achieve paramountcy under, say, 
corporate capitalism as opposed to entrepreneurial 
capitalism, etc.
There is a sleight of hand at work in Annie  
Hall. Despite its scenes of love and pain, it really 
reinforces our everyday notions of the 
transitoriness and atomisation of human 
relationships. The best we can do, it seems to say, 
is to grin and bear it - other people are pretty 
impossible, but because we need them (in a hazy, 
ill-defined way) for our existence, we must pursue
the limited, fleeting and fortuitous “happiness” 
they offer us, and move on when the happiness is 
dissipated. The film’s emotionality, then, is 
defined within concepts of self and the present.
W i t h i n  A n n i e  H a l l ’ s t e r m s ,  th e  
future/posterity doesn’t exist; it is remarkable that 
none of Alvie’s self-analyses ever involve the 
question of children. It is clear that he sees us 
trapped in a continuous present, on a treadmill, 
and it is only the here and now that matters.
Yet such abandonment of “ impossible”  
relationships is incapable of bringing relief or 
respite. Locked in a continuous present which 
lacks any political, public dimension, one 
responds by seeking emotional intimacy. But 
intimacy makes one vulnerable, dependent. To 
counteract this, Annie and Alvie - like many of us- 
contract their “intimacy” in specified terms, 
indicating a degree of manipulation, insensitivity 
and closure which almost negates any possibility 
for the intimacy which we initially sought.
The stratagems adopted in the narcissistic 
society maintain and advance the very processes 
and institutions which give rise to the anxiety in 
the first place.
Annie Hall is very much a '70s film, framed in 
the context of widespread political despair and 
disillusionment. It throws us back into ourselves, 
it “explains” away our indulgences, cruelties and 
obsessions, excusing them on grounds of The 
Human Condition - a kind of permanent cultural 
insanity. Yet it is easy to believe this film, in its 
honestly portrayed emotions, in the accuracy of 
the behaviors and attitudes displayed. But it is 
wrong, wrong, wrong.
Our experiences are historically specified. Of 
course we need other people, but the w ay we need 
other people will vary. We are not locked into a 
treadmill, where impossible demands are 
constantly made upon inadequate people. The 
logic of capital argues for static concepts, for a 
loyalty to personal survival based on satisfaction 
of individual needs, individually constructed, 
rather than loyalty to a process which affirms the 
social construction of needs and the possibilities 
both of a rational posterity and an end to 
domination.
Don’t be fooled by Annie H all’s stiff-upper-lip, 
take it with a smile, realism. It is a counsel of 
despair, of capitulation. The social reality it 
presents - of inexorable fragmentation and 
atomisation - is only accurate to the extent that we 
do not struggle against those institutions and 
understandings which fragment and atomise. In 
the case of Annie Hall, for instance, we must 
strive for definitions of emotion, commitment, 
understanding, love, and tolerance which 
transcend the film’s commonsense notions of 
these terms as operationalised under capitalism.
- Kathe Boehringer.
BOOK REVIEW
Love o f  W orker Bees, by Alexandra
Kollontai, translated by Cathy Porter. 
Afterword by Sheila Rowbotham. Virago 
Press. Reviewed by Mavis Robertson.
Those who already admire Alexandra Kollontai 
will have their admiration reinforced if they read 
L o v e  o f  W ork er  B ees , a collection o f three stories
one is really a novel - translated by Cathy Porter. 
Others, too, will profit from this fascinating work.
In Vasilisa Malygina a close personal 
relationship grows, falters, dies. Its fate is played 
out against a background o f revolution in Russia, 
later giving way to the adjustment o f  the NEP 
period. Vasilisa keeps her revolutionary idealism 
while her husband, Vladimir, more and more 
assumes the values o f a NEP manager. The 
b a ck grou n d  is  in d ica tive  o f  the au th or ’s 
judgments o f the period - she was closely identified 
with what was then known as the Workers’ 
Opposition • but her purpose is to show that the 
undoubted joys which derive from sexual passion 
are not sufficient to maintain personal happiness 
if  love and work are in conflict, or i f  the social 
priorities o f  one’s partner differ marKealy from 
one’s own.
The story does not avoid the hurts and the 
jealousy that result from a break-down in a close 
relationship. Indeed, a vital aspect in this and in 
the other two stories is the changing attitudes o f 
women to each other.
A t first, Vasilisa hates her husband’s new love, 
Nina, but, in time, this is replaced by a 
compassionate understanding so that finally she 
can say “ We’re not enemies, you and I. We never 
intended to cause each other so much pain” . 
Similarly, in Three Generations mothers and 
daughters with vastly differing moral codes 
misunderstand each other and hurt each other yet 
support each other absolutely when needed. And 
in Sisters a common bond is established between 
a rejected wife and her husband's mistress.
If the ending to Vasilisa Malygina is 
ideologically optimistic, it nevertheless leaves 
Vasilisa with tough days ahead.
In the other two stories the problems remain 
la rg e ly  u nresolved . A ll thus re fle ct v iew s 
expressed elsewhere by Kollontai. She recognised 
that women can only partially solve their 
problems in work, politics, personal relationships 
while striving to end the sexual division o f labor. 
She sees this as a very long project, not easily 
resolved and, meantime, women will continue to 
face  u n sa tis fa ctory  ch o ices  based bn the 
m ora lities , va lu es, preju d ices and fa lse  
expectations which derive from both class and 
sexual divisions.
Perhaps the most important point about these 
stories is that their author, a totally involved 
revolutionary leader, saw the need to help create a 
literature which promoted new values for women.
She wrote consciously in a form to suit the 
audience she wanted to reach - the working women 
o f  revolutionary Russia. If some find her style 
unsophisticated - with a “ Women’s Weekly”  flavor 
- although the content is entirely different - her aim 
deserves praise and emulation.
It is possible, too, to read these stories as 
h i s t o r i c a l  d o c u m e n t s  w h i c h  g i v e  o n e  
in terpretation  o f  the N E P period , o f  the 
inspirations and the corruptions o f  that time. And 
this reviewer hopes that those men (and women) 
who still predict that much o f what concerns 
w o m e n  w i l l  be  s o l v e d  i n e v i t a b l y  b y  
re v o lu tio n /so c ia lism  w ill read them , and 
especially ponder the meaning o f the development 
(or, more properly, the regression) o f  Vladimir, the 
husband in V asilisa Malygina.
Alexandra Kollontai’s works have received 
considerable attention in recent years. Socialist- 
feminists have helped revive interest in the 
writings o f  this communist-feminist who was the 
only woman in the leadership o f the Bolshevik 
Party in October 1917.
It is known that she experienced a political and 
personal life which was seldom smooth and 
untroubled. She ended a not unhappy marriage for 
a political life, including imprisonment and exile. 
She worked with and wrote about working women. 
In time, she became the first Bolshevik Minister o f 
Social Welfare and later the world’s first woman 
ambassador. She polemicised on morality and the 
working class and on the role o f  the family. She 
was a key figure in the development o f  the Soviet 
Union’s first marriage law. Her involvem ent in the 
Workers' Opposition laid the basis for later clashes 
with Stalin.
These very stories, so popular in 1923, were 
ridiculed a few years la ter. A nd she was vulnerable 
in other directions, having had several well 
publicised love affairs and some not so well 
known.
Kollontai has been criticised for her self­
censorship in what passes for her autobiography 
(A n  A u t o b i o g r a p h y  o f  a S e x u a l l y  
Emancipated Woman). It is suggested that this 
was her compromise with Stalin. The evidence is 
not conclusive. What may not be known is that she 
prepared her definitive autobiography in the late 
1940s in which she believed all her previous 
writings and actions would be seen in perspective. 
Unfortunately for her, and us, the manuscript has 
never been published.
Even so, and even with self-censorship, 
Kollontai wrote in her published autobiography of 
the “ eternal d efen sive w ar ag a in st the 
encroachment o f men on our individuality, a 
struggle revolving around the problem: work or 
marriage and love” .
These stories am plify that theme against a 
background o f great change in society, family and 
work. If there are no tidy solutions to the problems 
they raise there are valuable insights.

